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Sierra Leone was faced with a decade of a very bloody civil conflict. The conflict led to the 
mutilation and death of thousands of Sierra Leoneans with over a million becoming either 
internally displaced or leaving the country to become refugees in other countries. The war was 
started on the 23rd of March, 1991 by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) but other 
factions such as the Civil Defence Force (CDF), the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council 
(AFRC) and the so-called West Side Boys became key actors as the conflict progressed. The 
Lome Peace Agreement signed in 1999 established as one of its components the setting 
implementation of a Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants 
(DDR) programme.  At the end of the DDR in 2005 over 76,000 ex-combatants from the 
different factions were reintegrated into their communities of choice or origin. Coupled with 
this, they were assisted with reintegration packages that included training, education, 
agricultural kits, money etc. 
This study examines the current socio-economic status of the ex-combatants 10 years after the 
conflict in Sierra Leone. It examines the job opportunities, political space, relationship with 
community members, challenges faced, social networks involved in, relationship with former 
colleagues, access to land and other issues that are significant in the reintegration process of 
ex-combatants. It further studies the national socio-economic environment and how ex-
combatants are faring in the overall post-war recovery process in Sierra Leone. The study also 
comes up with recommendations as to how the challenges currently faced by ex-combatants 
could be overcome. 
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Contemporary armed conflicts are now “characterized by a number of traits that have not 
generally been associated with earlier armed conflicts.”1 Conflicts today “tend to occur more 
within rather than between states, where the rules of engagement tend to be defined at the 
local level” (Emerging Issues Peacebuild 2008:1).2 “Armed challenges to state power by non-
state actors are a defining feature of contemporary conflict, while transnational, multilateral, 
regional and bilateral actors also play ever more significant roles.”3 At the end of some of 
these conflicts peace processes are initiated which make provision for the Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of former combatants.  
This was the case of Sierra Leone, a country that went through a decade of a very bloody civil 
war characterized by the mutilation and loss of innocent lives and properties. The war which 
started in the Bomaru, Eastern Kailahun, was quick to consume the rest of the country with 
untold suffering engulfing the land. Many people running for their lives either became 
refugees or internally displaced persons (IDPs). Rape and torture became weapons of war 
used by the different factions with innocent women and children as their targets. These 
victims were also recruited into the different fighting factions while some volunteered into 
them for reasons of safety and personal security. Women became bush wives, sex slaves, 
spies, cooks and gun totters. The enormity of the war caught the attention of the international 
community especially with images of amputated and mutilated women and children.4   
With the support of the international community, several peace accords were signed which 
included the Abidjan, Conakry and Lome Peace Agreements. The first two accords failed but 
the Lome Agreement (despite the many challenges it faced) remained the final peace 
agreement signed.  The DDR of the different fighting factions was one of the many provisions 
it made.       
DDR is “geared towards collecting the weapons from former combatants and assist in their 
transformation process from combatants to normal civilians.”5 The reintegration aspect is 
important to the maintenance of peace as it limits the possibility for ex-combatants to be 
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 See: http://www.gordonfn.org/resfiles/yeung_emerging_issues.pdf (accessed on the 4th of June 2013) 
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 Bangura, I. (2010): ‘Making Peace Work: Women and Peacebuilding in Kailahun District’ Unpublished thesis, 
University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands pg.7. 
5
 See: http://www.wittenberg-center.org/download/DP_2012-
01_Bangura_Liberia_The_Transition_from_Destruction_to_Post-War_Reconstruction.pdf (accessed on the 5th 
of June 2013) 
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recruited. This is done by providing them an alternative source of livelihood and changing 
their mind-set through constructive engagement.6  
 
In 2002 the war was declared officially over by Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabba, the then 
president of Sierra Leone. 76,000 ex-combatants went through DDR with the different 
factions disintegrated. The DDR programme was led by the National Commission for DDR 
and supported by international actors which included the UN agencies and several other 
international and national agencies.  
After the collection of weapons from the combatants and their demobilization process they 
were assisted to return to their communities of origin or choice. This depended on what they 
wanted as some were fearful of returning to their communities of origin for crimes they had 
committed there. On their return they were provided with reintegration opportunities (socio-
economic) such as skills training, access to educational institutions, agricultural tools, start-up 
capitals etc. This was coupled with psycho-social counseling despite the fact that it was not 
effectively done due to the lack of trained and qualified personnel.  
 
The DDR programme helped to kick-start local economies as quick impact projects were 
introduced and ex-combatants were encouraged to work with local community members to 
foster peace and reconciliation. Parallel to the DDR programme, a twin transitional justice 
mechanism process was initiated: “the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL).”7 This twin initiative was meant to seek redress for 
the victims of the war by facilitating a reconciliatory process through the TRC with the 
mandate of “creating an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human rights 
and humanitarian law related to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone…”8 The SCSL was “given 
the mandate to try those who bear the greatest responsibility for war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and violations of international humanitarian laws.”9  
However, DDR programmes are time and budget bound and normally span from 3 to 5 years. 
Thus, the DDR programme came to an end in Sierra Leone in 2007. This is due to the fact that 
                                                          
6
 Interview 1: Zinurine Alghali is a staff of the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes 
(ACCORD) in Durban, South Africa. Interview  conducted on the 7
th
 of December 2012 
7
 See: http://rct.dk/media/416885/cedsa_report_sierraleone%20pdf.pdf (accessed on the 6th of June 2013) 
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 See: http://www.scu.edu/scjil/archive/v5_NovogrodskyArticle.pdf (accessed 7th of June 2013) Also see: 
Humper, J.C (2009): “The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission” Freetown, Sierra Leone, pg.1. 
9
 See: http://www.sc-sl.org (accessed on the 6
th
 of June 2013) Humper, J.C (2009): “The Sierra Leone Truth and 




DDR by itself is not responsible for the overall development process of post-conflict 
countries; it only feeds into the growth and development process. At the end of DDR 
programmes reintegration processes begin. This is a process that the ex-combatants personally 
go through for the rest of their lives. How smooth it gets is up to the kind of support they were 
provided with in the form of skills trainings and how they could access alternative sources of 
livelihoods and take care of themselves and their families.  
This study critically examines the socio-economic reintegration process of ex-combatants in 
Sierra Leone ten years after the war. The study fundamentally highlights the actual 
possibilities and challenges faced by ex-combatants, their causes and correlations and provide 
recommendations on possible further interventions to overcome the challenges.  
 
















2. Theoretical Framework 
 
Although some literature and research reports are available on DDR, international 
organisations, especially UN agencies, fail to evaluate their programmes in a way which 
shows their real impact. Through a review of this literature it became apparent that after a 
certain period of the official end of the programme, a longer-term evaluation is missing in 
most cases. Thus, there has been limited focus on the reintegration process as the bulk of the 
concentration is on the programme. For clarity the term ‘programme’ in this context refers to 
the intended activities that make up reintegration as part of a formal DDR programme, whilst 
‘process’ reflects to the actual longer-term process of socio-economic reintegration that ex-
combatants experience. A reintegration programme and process are inextricably linked as a 
successful programme will have direct implications on the sustainability of the reintegration 
process.  
Whilst the programme is integral, it is the sustained process which really plays a part in 
ensuring sustained peace as “successful long-term reintegration can make a major 
contribution to national conflict resolution and to restoration of social capital”10 (Colletta et al 
1998: 18). This chapter aims to explore the range of theories and conclusions on the role and 
experience of the reintegration process, using Sierra Leone and other country cases as 
illustrative examples. This will then be used as a conceptual framework for examining the 
hypothesis that ex-combatants are ‘reintegrated into poverty’ which will be the focus of the 
rest of the paper.  
According to Irma Specht (2012)11 “a reintegration process is a long-term process and it is a 
process that the ex-combatants have to undergo by themselves with the support of families 
and local communities. It begins at the end of the reintegration programme; however, the 
reintegration programme prepares the ex-combatants for the process”.12 Thus, a weak or ill-
implemented reintegration programme will have an immense effect on the success of the 
reintegration process. This is largely due to the fact that a poor reintegration process will 
result in ex-combatants failing to be in a position to face the challenges presented by normal 
societies. Ex-combatants may therefore be forced to either live reclusive lives (shy away from 
society) or resort to violence as a coping strategy. The capacity of reintegration to provide a 
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 Also see: http://statesandsecurity.org/_pdfs/Kilroy.pdf (Accessed on the 3rd of June 2013) 
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 Lecture done at the Barcelona Peace Academy on the 20th of December 2012 
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 Also see: http://www.bicc.de/uploads/pdf/tresa/RSC-06A02.pdf (Accessed on the 5th of June 2013) 
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viable alternative livelihood in an inclusive community environment is therefore crucial. The 
factors affecting this issue are explored throughout this section. Before examining this 
hypothesis further it is important for us to understand who an ex-combatant is and why 
reintegration is necessary.  
According to Ratnavale (2001)13 “ex-combatants are a potentially dangerous group in the 
society if not integrated, but they are also a group of people with traumas, disabilities, social 
stigmas and are often without automatic access to land, jobs, or income generating activities. 
They need assistance in the process of leaving the life of being a soldier to becoming normal 
civilians.” This point is strongly emphasised by Irma Specht (2003) who stated in her work 
“Jobs for Rebels and Soldiers” that “assistance is needed, not only in changing the mind-set 
but also in making their neighbours and family members respect them again, something that 
is much easier if they can provide an income for themselves and their dependants.” In giving 
up their guns ex-combatants are giving up their source of power and livelihood. Therefore, 
reintegration programmes are, or should be, tailored towards assisting the ex-combatants to 
find alternative sources of livelihood through peaceful means. 
Further to this Joe-Patrick Amara,14 a socio-economic reintegration specialist based in the 
Republic of South Sudan, argues that: 
“Different programmes define who a combatant is depending on who they want to target. As 
a whole, anybody that in one way or another was associated with a fighting group whether as 
cooks, load carriers or gun totters, is a combatant. But in Sierra Leone and Liberia, due to 
the available budget and timeframe particularly gun totters were targeted by the DDR. Those 
who did not carry guns but served in various roles within the different armed groups and 
fighting forces were included in the general post-war reconstruction programmes that were 
developed.” 
In defining who an ex-combatant is, Benjamin Olagboye15 a reintegration specialist in La 
Cote d’Ivoire, stated that the definition states the eligibility criteria and who will eventually 
benefit from the a DDR programme. In a lecture16 at the Kofi Annan International 
Peacekeeping Training Center in Accra, Ghana, he presented the case of La Cote d’Ivoire as 
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 Ratnavale (2001): Abstracts from " Preparing for Peace and Healing the Psyche in Sri Lanka ", Annex III 
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 Lecture on DDR conducted at the University of Sierra Leone in 2011.  
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 Lecture done on the 25th of November 2013 during the Advance DDR Course. 
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follows: “La Cote d’Ivoire is presently plagued with the eligibility criteria. This needs to be 
clarified and there should be a joint operation plan on DDR with a focus on reintegration that 
all the actors should be clear on.” 
In many cases reintegration programme designers fail to understand the circumstances of the 
ex-combatants before designing programmes. Ex-combatants become part of a fighting force 
either through forceful recruitment or forced or unforced volunteerism. Many of those who 
volunteer willingly do so because of the context within which they lived. Factors responsible 
for volunteerism may include, but are not limited to, marginalization, revenge or poverty. 
Leaders of fighting groups use the vulnerability of young people especially, to recruit them 
into fighting forces. This was the case in “Sierra Leone, Liberia, Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) and presently Uganda and Sudan.”17 Although the need for a holistic DDR 
process was recognised relatively early on practitioners have consistently failed to achieve a 
broader contextual approach in design and implementation (Kilroy 2009: 3). Failure to 
understand the context in which civilians become soldiers has direct implications on the 
sustainability and success of a reintegration programme, which in turn will influence the 
success of the reintegration process (Jennings 2007).  
As indicated by Prieto “the complexity as to how DDR is implemented and how it can 
subsequently contribute to the maintenance of peace leads to programmes should be taken 
into consideration at the design stage. This is due to the fact that the success of a DDR 
programme is largely measures by how the process unfolds.”18 An unclear reintegration 
programme design also leads to a failure to address the roots of the conflict, and does not 
include all parties that were involved in the conflict, including communities.19 If the 
programme targets all relevant stakeholders and takes into consideration the root causes of the 
conflict it will to a very large extent be successful. Subsequently the programme will ensure 
that the process is successful. If the programme is ill-defined and poorly-implemented, the 
country will have the potential of relapsing into another conflict. 
At this juncture is it also pertinent to note that different stakeholders tend to see reintegration 
as fulfilling different functions. Many from a military and government perspective see DDR 
                                                          
17
 See: http://www.unicef.org/tdad/seenbutnotheardsecurityagenda.pdf (accessed on the 6th of June 2013) 
18
 Prieto, J. D. (2012): "Together after War While the War Goes On: Victims, Ex-Combatants and Communities in 
Three Colombian Cities", International Journal of Transitional Justice. Also see: Holguin, Jimena (2010): 
“Communitarian reintegration in DDR programs: an analysis of the communitarian component of the 
reintegration program in Colombia, 2002-2008” p. 5-6. 
19
 Holguin, Jimena (2010), p. 6. 
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as having a temporary and pragmatic function, for example disarming to prevent future 
danger. This has an additional symbolic purpose of building up confidence within 
communities and society. Indeed scholars such as Mark Duffield argue that DDR, and other 
peacebuilding activities, has the primary function of containing the threat of insecurity 
(Duffield 2008, Keinscherf 2011).  By containing non-insured20 groups, deemed to cause 
instability in society such as ex-combatants, development agents are thus able to contain 
insecurity at all levels. On the other hand “donors and development agencies see these 
processes as viable long-term development programmes, and view ex-combatants as a 
potential labor force” (SIDDR 2006 and Muggah 2005).21 Therefore to an actor who 
considers the primary function of reintegration to be to reduce the size of armed groups and 
promote stability the success of a reintegration process may be viewed differently from an 
actor of believes that reintegration predominantly serves an economic function. Although 
some DDR programmes have been designed both with the “short term aim of stabilization” 
and the long term aim of “economic development”, these two components frequently conflict 
with each other (Berdal & Ucko 2009). 
 
Reintegration programmes are generally divided into social, economic and political 
components. Emphasis on each component varies from context to context and between the 
stakeholders involved.  
For the economic component, a strict analysis of the institutional capacities and conditions of 
the target community is needed prior to the start of the programme (Holguin 2010: 30). 
Furthermore, the vocational training offered in reintegration ‘packages’ should be linked to 
the actual demands of the market (Bangura and Specht 2012: 58).22.  A detailed analysis of 
service providers coupled with a needs assessment, opportunity mapping and labour market 
analysis are needed to render vocational trainings provided to ex-combatants effective.  
In Sierra Leone, promises and high expectations of ex-combatants acquiring skills and jobs 
failed to be delivered upon. Even in cases where some promises of opportunities were kept, 
the training delivered did not aim at addressing the economic needs of the ex-combatants and 
local communities and no employment opportunities were provided (Ginifer 2003: 41). 
Factors that inhibited the progress of the DDR programme, and process, were not only limited 
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 In other words peripheral groups less able to access the state safety net such as ex-combatants. 
21
 Muggah, R (2005):  "No Magic Bullet: A Critical Perspective on Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration (DDR) and Weapons Reduction in Post-conflict Contexts", The Round Table, London 
22
 Also see: http://www.c-r.org/accord-article/work-not-war-youth-transformation-liberia-and-sierra-leone 
(Aaccessed on the 14th of June 2013) 
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to the capacity of the local economy but also to the capacity of local and international 
implementing partners. Their restricted capacity to deliver assistance hampered the 
opportunities that the target groups should have benefitted from (Ginifer 2003: 42). 
Subsequently, the ex-combatants were left unprepared to compete for alternative sources of 
livelihood during their reintegration process. This was mostly due to the limited capacity they 
have and the inability of the programme to link them to real opportunities that they could 
benefit from. Furthermore, Kilroy argues that “without a range of available economic 
opportunities, interventions such as vocational training to help ex-combatants find an 
alternative livelihood may still leave them unemployed and disillusioned” (Kilroy 2009: 2). 
23Linking ex-combatants to local markets and wider community structures is therefore an 
integral part of a successful reintegration process.  
Further to the above, the lack of service providers who can deliver services needed in the 
reintegration process poses a significant challenge to the reintegration process of ex-
combatants (Ginifer 2003: 45). As previously stated information on the labour market in the 
country are necessary to plan successful reintegration programs, as otherwise ex-combatants 
may be trained in skills which are not needed on the job market, which can lead to a rise in 
unemployment and a failure to meet expectations, both of which can have dire consequences 
on the future stability of an area (Holguin 2010: 41).  
Although vocational training in Kosovo was an important step towards secure employment or 
successful establishment of business for ex-combatants, the competition was very high and 
the probability of finding employment was very low. Nevertheless small enterprises were very 
important in the rehabilitation process of the country (Barakat, Sultan and Özerdem 2003: 37). 
Depending on the country’s situation, the program needs to be designed to link training and 
job opportunities successfully (Holguin 2010: 51). Reality has to be faced and missed 
opportunities need to serve as lessons learnt. Barakat, Sultan and Ozerdem conclude that “… 
the reintegration strategy in Kosovo could have benefited greatly from information on 
existing markets, future potential markets, the needs of people to be reintegrated and 
employed, and the possibilities for education, vocational training and business training” 
(Barakat, Sultan and Özerdem 2003: 35). At the end of the day, some ex-combatants may be 
in a better position to access employment opportunities than others. For example in Ethiopia, 
for female ex-combatants who often held auxiliary and logistical positions in their army rather 
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 See: http://statesandsecurity.org/_pdfs/Kilroy.pdf (Accessed on the 8th of July 2013) 
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than serving as fighting combatants, economic reintegration was found easier because often 
they had skills that appeared more marketable to the current economic situation (Colletta et al. 
1996: 78).  
In resource-scarce environments a heavy focus on the economic component of reintegration 
can lead to dangerous precedents and a situation of “the only game in town” (Muggah 2005: 
246). This can create tension and animosity between the ex-combatants and receiving 
communities as they both vie for limited resources in a post-conflict context. In such cases, 
receiving communities may perceive ex-combatants as being given preferential treatment 
and/or being rewarded despite the fact that they have committed atrocities, whilst they (the 
“victims”) are left out. This “favourable treatment … in comparison with ordinary civilians 
raises many questions” (Kilroy 2009: 1). Thus, practitioners like Specht (2007)24 have called 
for an inclusive approach in which there is dual targeting of ex-combatants and receiving 
communities, as the best approach to be used in order to avoid conflict between ex-
combatants and receiving communities.  
This model also creates room for the involvement of ex-combatants to actively participate in 
issues related to their communities. Involving former combatants in decision-making 
processes at all levels is conducive to the success of the reintegration process and helps 
prevent them from regrouping and remobilizing into armed groups (Barakat, Sultan and 
Özerdem 2003: 29). This ‘participatory approach’ can result in a higher level of ownership, 
both amongst community members and ex-combatants, thereby strengthening the 
peacebuilding process (Dzisnesa 2006, Bell & Watson 2006: 5). 
Ex-combatants who are frustrated with their reintegration process due to unsecured 
employment often drift into criminality and remain a potential threat to a renewed outbreak of 
conflict (Ginifer 2003: 39). The potential instability of these groups highlights the importance 
of the economic component of reintegration in creating sustainable alternative livelihoods for 
ex-combatants.  
Even though the social component of the reintegration phase was seen as being successful in 
Liberia, the economic reintegration did not include important components for the period after 
the implementation, such as agricultural training (Blattman et al 2011: 38). Furthermore, 
although 80% of the DDR participants in South Sudan declared themselves as unemployed, a 
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 Specht, I (2007): Community Based Reintegration in the Democratic Republic of Congo‘ OxfamNovib and 
Transition International, The Netherlands. 
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closer look at the situation of ex-combatants and war-affected people showed that formal 
employment and regular salary was limited, but the number of small scale businesses in urban 
areas, subsistence agriculture, self-employment and finding employment in the informal 
sector had increased, therefore the number of self-declared unemployed people has to be seen 
relative to the economic circumstances in the country (Lamb: 59-60). The above stated 
examples provide an indication of the importance of understanding the context and needs of a 
community before designing and implementing a programme.  
The social component of the reintegration process is sometimes combined with political 
reintegration. According to Muggah (2005: 248) “the management of national political issues 
associated with reconciliation and peacebuilding, as well as the meaningful reform of the 
structures in the justice, government and economic sectors form the basis for a successful 
reintegration programme.”25 Social reintegration ensures the peaceful coexistence of ex-
combatants with families and communities, while change of roles has to be noticed (Barakat, 
Sultan and Özerdem 2003: 29). Holguin emphasizes the importance of this component while 
raising the question:  
“how can a communitarian reintegration project be developed in a society with huge 
numbers of former combatants, displaced persons and victims of violence who, in the 
aftermath of war, come back at the same time to their place and try to resettle in their 
communities without any reconciliation process and even counseling support?” 
(Holguin 2010: 52).  
Reintegration designers in most cases fail to constructively engage local communities during 
the design and implementation of reintegration projects and programmes (Kilroy 2009). As 
noted earlier, reintegration is a process which continues after the programmes have come to 
an end. For the process to be sustainable the role of the community is crucial, particularly for 
children, ex-combatants with disabilities and women who tend to be more vulnerable groups. 
When the community accepts and actively participates in the programme, ex-combatants get 
extra support from family and community members. However, the exclusion of local 
communities has the potential of turning community members into potential “spoilers” of the 
process (Stedman 1997). In a report of global lessons learned on DDR, Meek & Malan found 
that attention to the dynamics between community members and ex-combatants is 
consequently being seen as an important part of ensuring successful reintegration (Meek & 
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 Muggah, R (2005): "No Magic Bullet: A Critical Perspective on Disarmament, Demobilization and 
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Malan 2004). Furthermore, Pouligny finds that “community consultation and engagement … 
is critical to successful DDR programmes” (Pouligny 2005: 498). 
 
The Centre for International Cooperation and Security (CICS) at the University of Bradford 
“sees community-based reintegration as key to empowering host communities, improving 
constructive organisational capacities, improving efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability, 
and strengthening local government.”26 These components are important to the successful 
reintegration process of ex-combatants as they increase the absorption capacity of 
communities to host and peacefully co-habit with ex-combatants.  
 
Specht argues that community-based reintegration is linked with ´voice and representation´ of 
ex-combatants (Specht 2007:31), stressing that “the perceived lack of voice and 
representation is one of the factors that have, in the past, caused many ex-combatants to return 
to violence”. She emphasised that “this is particularly the case for young ex-combatants who 
feel excluded from processes that they should be part of, especially in areas that have to do 
with their growth and development” (Specht 2007:31).  
 
In addition to the economic, social and political components of reintegration, security is also 
an important related factor. The security of disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated former 
fighters must be provided as a precondition to reintegration. That was not the case in 
Afghanistan where the target groups lived in fear, which hampered the reintegration process 
(Derksen 2011: 2). On the other hand, in Sierra Leone communities affected by violence were 
involved in the reconciliation process, together with victims and former combatants, which 
made the acceptance in communities easier. In addition some form of counseling and special 
psychosocial assistance was provided to “make them [the ex-combatants] conscious that the 
hardest part of the process would be to gain the acceptance in the communities that suffered 
from violence” (Holguin 2010: 43).  
In many cases the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission 
(NDDRC) acted together with religious and traditional leaders as mediators to facilitate a 
reconciliation process between the different actors to receive ex-combatants in the 
communities. Additionally, returnees were encouraged to contribute to the communities they 
returned to through participation in activities and contributing of skills. Steps were 
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successfully taken to prevent further conflict and violence which makes a reintegration 
programme, and eventually the process, more difficult (Holguin 2010: 53). This again 
illustrates the importance of a more inclusive approach to reintegration.  
Key spoiling factors identified have been related to the sense of exclusion suffered by 
receiving communities as they feel left out by DDR planners and designers. On the part of the 
ex-combatants, lack of confidence in democratic processes, elections, state and local 
institutions and governments bring them back into their illegal groups (Holguin 2010: 39). 
Indeed Humphreys & Weinstein argue that “without skills and isolated from social networks, 
combatants face an uphill battle in re-establishing a non-military way of life” (Humphreys & 
Weinstein 2005: 2). However, “development actors often forget that DDR … follow, rather 
than lead, the political process” (Muggah 2005: 248). In Liberia, the combination of 
psychosocial assistance and life skills education with practical skills has been an important 
step towards a peaceful coexistence of ex-combatants and the communities and the build-up 
of a peaceful society (Blattman  Annan 2011: 36). However, in Aceh, Indonesia, special 
groups such as the poor, elderly and IDPs tend to do better in community-decision making 
processes when compared to ex-combatants and the communities show low levels of 
tolerance to ex-combatants (Barron et al 2009: 48-49). Again, if the social component of 
reintegration is unsuccessful, high risk and vulnerable groups are likely to feel excluded from 
society and may thus rejoin armed groups, increasing the risk of future conflict.  
 
Countries coming out of a violent past have limited capacity to address the plethora of 
challenges associated with the aftermath of war; external donors play a vital role in funding 
interventions such as a DDR program. Due to the order of implementation, funding shortfalls 
affect especially the reintegration phase and prevent steady progress (Ginifer 2003: 39), 
potentially undermining the whole process (Kilroy 2009: 3, Spear 2006). In Liberia, the 
inability to have sufficient funds was a key challenge for a successful reintegration 
programme (Holguin 2010: 53). Because of limited funds often only short-term reintegration 
programmes are carried out and medium and long-term objectives are not in the agenda, 
which are the most necessary ones for the society and the reintegrated target groups (Ginifer 
2003: 40). This proves devastating to the impact and sustainability of the programmes and 
subsequently the process as the ex-combatants are left on their own. It is obvious that through 
constant follow-up and monitoring, long-term and successful reintegration processes can be 
supported (Blattman and Annan 2011: 36). However, monitoring and evaluation of 
programmes is seldom done after the lifespan of reintegration programmes.  
20 
 
Another component of reintegration which is increasingly being emphasized is the issue of 
Children Associated with Armed Forces and Groups (CAAFGs). Over the years more and 
more DDR programmes included a special programme for children and youth. As Ursano and 
Shaw (2007: 567) stated “abused and tortured, while required to wound and kill—such is the 
daily world of nearly a quarter of a million child soldiers.”27 The trauma and shock of war 
gravely affects CAAFAGs and this is mostly due to the tenderness of their age.  They 
sometimes encounter difficulties in adjusting to their new lives, with some appearing 
emotionally cut-off and suppressed, whilst others are preoccupied with violence in their 
recreational activities and play (Apio 2008: i). Additionally CAAFAG face an additional 
challenge in reintegration back into communities as they are minors requiring adult support 
and supervision. They require a wide range of support from reintegration experts, family and 
local communities.  
 
According to the international organisation the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), there were 9 main elements which should have been addressed to 
build up a successful child and youth reintegration programme in Sierra Leone:  
“1) community sensitization; 2) formal disarmament and demobilization; 3) transition 
periods in separate centers for boys and girls located well away from adult DDR sites; 
4) tracing and family mediation; 5) return to family and community, and follow-up, 
and extended monitoring for children not placed with their parents; 6) traditional 
cleansing ceremonies, traditional healing, and religious support; 7) school or skills 
training of adequate quality and duration, coupled with literacy and numeracy 
instruction and provision of tools, materials, and follow-up counseling; 8) ongoing 
access to health care, particularly for war-related conditions for those in school or 
training; 9) individual supportive counseling, facilitation, and encouragement” 
(Williamson 2005 17-19). 
To successfully reintegrate children, the opportunity to access education school or provided 
with skills training is very important, as it helps them to establish their “new identity and 
increases the acceptance by their family and community members”.28 This process can be 
supported by the development of Child Welfare Committees (CWC) and Child Clubs29 and 
through follow-up services and constant support from social workers, provided for example 
                                                          
27
 Also see: http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/extract/298/5/567 (accessed on the 16th of June 2013) 
28
 See:  http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACH599.pdf (accessed on the 17th of June 2013) 
29
 Also see: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACH599.pdf (accessed on the 17th of June 2013) 
21 
 
by NGOs, which support not only the children, but also parents and community members who 
help to foster the reintegration of the children (Williamson 2005: 16). In Ethiopia, “the 
situation of former child soldiers is probably the worst, both economically and 
psychosocially” (Colletta 1996: 78). Returning from their armed groups no special 
programme was provided to reintegrate this vulnerable group mostly without marketable 
skills and education. Due to the lack of schools or courses especially for the young ex-
combatants and former child soldiers, there was an increase in the disinterest of studying and 
interest of occupation related to economic survival. Due to these facts only 12% of the minors 
are studying and 20% of them had abandoned school in Angola (Christian Children’s Fund 
1998: 29). The reintegration of youth and children is a very sensitive part in the reintegration 
programme and dealing with issues related to children and youth is very challenging in 
ongoing DDR programmes. 
Like dealing with children during reintegration programmes and processes, the issue of ex-
combatants with disabilities is also crucial. Conflicts leave communities with a significant 
percentage of people with disabilities (PWDs) (disabilities could be physical or mental). 
PWDs require all the help they could possibly get to overcome the challenges they are likely 
to face and live a normal life. To ensure their safety and protection, the reintegration of PWDs 
requires advance planning, taking into consideration the community they are going to, the 
nature of their disability and the type and special assistance each might require (ILO 2003: 1). 
Unfortunately, this is mostly not the case as programmes are mostly ill-prepared and ill-
financed. At the same time the concern is mostly on those who are not physically challenged 
as they are perceived to be of threat to society. Idowu Ibishomi,30 a reintegration expert, 
expressed strong feeling on the way PWDs are treated: 
“Ex-combatants with disabilities are treated with levity as they are perceived not to be of 
threat to society. Programme designers are oblivious of the fact that these people need much 
more support than those that are not physically challenged. The focus is on their disability 
rather than their abilities. At the same time the private sector is not encouraged to work with 
them when there is a lot of possibilities for employment for them that could be developed.” 
 
In looking at DDR programmes and girls/women Specht (2006:5) stated that “despite their 
specific needs and capacities, girl combatants tend to be neglected in DDR programmes, 
mainly because they are not regarded as a security threat.” DDR planners and implementers 
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concentrate their attention on the men who are seen as potential spoilers to the peacebuilding 
process.31 Thus, activities organised are not gender sensitive and do not address the principal 
reasons why the female combatants became fighters. Also, the eligibility criteria set exclude 
women who play support roles and are dependants of male combatants. In presenting the 
trauma of their neglect32, Specht further stated that “girls will remain, as during conflict, at 
risk from violence and other threats. They and their households will face great economic 
difficulties, and often stand at a disadvantage in gaining income compared to males. They will 
typically be left with no alternatives but unacceptable coping strategies (crime, sex work, 
dependence on abusive partners)33. Ultimately, if not included in DDR, girls, like boys, are 
also a potential source of crime, civil unrest and/or recruits for other armed groups.”34 
 
Even in cases where they are included, activities designed for them are based on stereotypes 
and not what they actually need. Also, former colleagues of the opposite sex are seen playing 
active roles when it comes to engagement in the peace process while the girls and young 
women are excluded. They are then exposed to activities that are steretypically designed that 
will contiue keeping female combatants in lowly paid jobs (Date-Bah 2003).  
 
The reintegration process of former female combatants is in most cases much more difficult 
than that faced by those of the opposite sex. This is the case because in addition to the 
economic challenges faced there is a significant amount of social pressure placed on them by 
the societies in which they find themselves. Taking an active role in a fighting force is seen as 
a taboo and unwomanly (Rokhaya 2001:29). As a result, Specht stated that “many women 
face rejection by their families and in-laws upon return from the conflict, which means that 
they risk being excluded from traditional community-based social-support systems. Perceived 
sexual impurity, even where girls have been forced into sex, can have the same effect” 
(Specht 2006:8).  
 
In examining reintegration outcomes of reintegration programmes and the process itself, it is 
argued that peace and stability relies heavily on the economic opportunities available to ex-
combatants. Johnah Schulhofer-Wohl and Nicholas Sambanis (2010: 10) argued that “if crime 
is motivated by the paucity of profitable non-expropriative economic activity for ex-
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combatants, then in theory several components of DDR programs can help reduce post-
conflict crime and violence by helping to economically reintegrate ex-combatants.” This 
signifies that the elements of reintegration do not only play a lead role in the reintegration 
process of ex-combatants but also in ensuring the peace and security of the countries affected. 
The fundamental issue raised here is ex-combatants having an alternative source of livelihood 
that will help them live in decency and dignity and subsequently see the need for peace and 
tranquility. A poor reintegration programme will lead to a poor reintegration process, thereby 
creating an unstable environment, as stated by Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis (2010: 11) 
“poor DDR programmes could be attributed to poor security outcomes.” 
Babiker and Özerdem (2003) stated that DDR is most effective when it is a stage in a process. 
They strongly assert that ex-combatants should be “reintegrated into a society where genuine 
efforts are made to develop the society overall. Thus, while schemes may initially be directed 
specifically at ex-combatants, the goal must be to mainstream those programmes within a 
wider strategy of development35. To them, ex-combatants are mostly reintegrated into poverty 
and the reintegration of ex-combatants into poverty is not success, and is part of the reason 
why many conflicts reignite.”36  
This point is strongly supported by Baare (2001) who also stated that in most cases ex-
combatants are ‘reintegrated into poverty’. The failure of the reintegration programme to 
adequately prepare ex-combatants for an alternative source of livelihood creates the 
possibility of them going back into the same conditions there were in before the conflict. As a 
result, when faced with poverty, deprivation and unemployment the “temptation is to turn to 
crime. The involvement of ex-combatants in crime, either opportunistic or organized, has 
been evidenced in places such as Mozambique, South Africa, El Salvador, Cambodia, 
Nicaragua and Angola”37 (Rolston 2007, Knight and Özerdem 2004). ‘Reintegration into 
Poverty’ has been seen in countries like Liberia and Uganda where the ex-combatants are 
faced with the challenge of coping with daily survival. The trainings provided to them are not 
sufficient to help them overcome poverty and destitution. They cannot compete for 
employment as they are disadvantaged in the transitional job market (Rolston 2007: 263). 
Faced with this challenge many ex-combatants are mostly incapable of taking care of their 
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families. This knowledge has lead Humphreys & Weinstein (2005:1) to conclude that there is 
“only weak evidence that participation in DDR programmes improves reintegration prospects 
at the individual level.”38 
We can assume from the above analysis that much of the current literature available on the 
reintegration process is centered on the successes and challenges faced by reintegration 
programmes and processes. Several key themes emerge repeatedly; firstly that ex-combatants 
are key players in the drive from war to peace. Additionally, the success or failure of the 
reintegration programme/process positively or negatively impacts the peace process. We can 
also conclude that there are a range of different functions of a DDR programme and that 
consequently different stakeholders will view reintegration as fulfilling different functions. 
 
Scholars and policy makers alike place emphasis on the importance of linking DDR, and 
particularly reintegration, to wider structural processes of peacebuilding. Furthermore it is 
believed that the success of the economic, political and social components of a reintegration 
process is largely dependent on the inclusive capacity of the programme to involve all 
stakeholders. As previously mentioned, a programme which treats ex-combatants in isolation 
of the rest of society is much less likely to be successful.  
 
However, despite this knowledge reintegration programmes continually suffer failure. This 
study builds upon the argument of Babiker and Özerdem (2003) which states both that ex-
combatants are usually reintegrated into poverty, and that DDR should be viewed as a stage in 
the process of post-war recovery. Reintegrating ex-combatants into poverty is inimical to the 
peace and security of their communities and countries. This study looks at the reintegration 
process of ex-combatants and their current socio-economic status. It tries to examine whether 
they were reintegrated into poverty and examines how they fit into the overall post-war 
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3. Context            
 3.1 Origins of the war in Sierra Leone 
  
On the 23rd of March 1991, the fire of rebel conflict which enveloped Liberia was lit in Sierra 
Leone in a nightmarish glow of death and destruction (Koroma 1996: 138). Abdul Karim 
Koroma39 stated in his book ‘Sierra Leone: The Agony of a Nation’ that “it began at dawn in 
Bomaru and Sienga, in the eastern district of Kailahun……. A coordinated surprise attack by 
heavily armed elements of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) with Sierra 
Leoneans trained and armed in Liberia was made on the two border towns. The rebels 
……..had moved from their base in Voinjama in the northern Lofa County of Liberia 
bordering Sierra Leone. When the attack was over, it left one major, one lieutenant and eleven 
civilians dead. Troops from the Daru barracks were rushed to the towns, and in the ensuing 
battle, the invaders withdrew with heavy losses.” (Koroma 1996: 139).  
 
The prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) David Crane graphically 
described the attack “this is a tale of horror, beyond the gothic into the realm of Dante's 
inferno. They came across the border, dark shadows, on a warm spring day, 23 March of 
1991. Hardened rebels trained by outside actors from Liberia, Libya and Burkino Faso. 
These rebels consisting of Sierra Leoneans and Liberians were assisted by Libyan Special 
Forces...and they were approximately 250”  (SCSL 2004:1). 
 
Crane stated in his indictment of the RUF that the attack was planned on the 27th of February 
1991 and those who planned the attack included Sierra Leoneans and Liberia- “Isaac 
Mussah40, NPFL Battle Front Commander, Oliver Varney, NPFL War Propaganda Advisor, 
Oliver Council, NPFL Deputy Training Commandant, Grace Beatrice Minor, NPFL Political 
Advisor, Brigadier John Tarnue, NPFL Training Commandant, and Joe Mulbah, NPFL 
Information Officer and Foday Sankoh and Augustine Gbao from Sierra Leone.” The military 
training41 was done in “Liberia at Camp Jackson Maama, a former artillery base located in 
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Bong County. The training, done under the direction of Brigadier Tarnue, was completed by 
Special Forces from Libya and Burkina Faso.”42 
 
The cause of the invasion appeared very unclear to many Sierra Leoneans and even the 
government for a while. Government authorities assumed that it was mere cross border 
attacks by rebels of the NPFL.43 By then there was fierce fighting in Liberia between the 
government of Samuel Doe and the NPFL. The question on the minds of Sierra Leoneans at 
that time was “what really happened in Kailahun and is Sierra Leone at war, or was it as 
people say activities of bandits?44Answers were shortly provided as ‘Several towns in 
Kailahun district became targets, and soon succumbed to the invading rebel forces. Among 
the early casualties were: On the 27th of March, 1991, Buedu was attacked and occupied by a 
rebel force of 300 men armed with AK-47 assault rifles, heavy caliber machine guns and 
rocket propelled grenade launchers (RPGs). On the 28th of March, 1991, with reinforcements 
bringing their troop strength close to 400 men the rebels occupied the Buedu customs post. 
On the 29th of March 1991, at 04.30 hours, the main commercial center of Koindu was taken, 
followed by the extensive looting and destruction of the town” (Koroma 1996:139).  
Sierra Leone was now at war and the leader of the insurgency group (which became known as 
the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) identified to be Foday Saybana Sankoh. Sankoh had a 
history of bitterness against the All People’s Congress (APC) which was the government in 
power. This bitterness stemmed from his earlier involvement in a failed coup attempt in 1971. 
When asked about Sankoh and his grievance against the APC, Mohamed Lainkuray 
Bangura45 a high level APC official had this to say: “Sankoh was arrested in 1971 after a coup 
plot organised by Brigadier Bangura was foiled by the Steven’s administration. He was 
imprisoned for seven years, later released and dismissed from the army. Sankoh was close to 
Bangura and when Bangura was arrested it was alleged that he was also part of those who 
organised the coup.”   
Sankoh remained in Sierra Leone after being released from prison nursing his grudge until he 
was recruited in the early 80s and taken to Libya. According to Koroma (1996:143), Sankoh 
was “born in the northern Tonkolili district and had spent several years as a young man in the 
town of Segbwema in Kailahun district. He had subsequently enlisted in the national army 
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where he served as a signals man and official photographer.” He served “briefly as part of the 
failed United Nations peacekeeping operation in Congo in the early 1960s”46, an experience 
which brought him contempt for the UN47 (The Economist 2003).48 While fanning his hatred 
for the APC and especially the president Major General Joseph Saidu Momoh, “the 
uncharismatic, ill-educated and of inadequate military combat training, Sankoh, nonetheless 
dreamt of political power to be achieved through the barrel of the gun……... He endeavoured 
to improve on his intellectual deficiencies by reading and constantly listening to the British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and Voice of America (VOA) radio broadcasts. He scorned 
the national radio as an agency of government. But Sankoh would never forget that scores had 
to be settled, at whatever level - personal or national, and no matter how long it took to attain 
this objective. With these factors now in active play in Sankoh′s mind, a rebel was born” 
(Koroma: 96:143). Sankoh´s mindset could be compared to Victor Hugo´s49 Jean Valjean who 
“condemned society and sentenced it. He sentenced it to his hatred. He made it responsible for 
the doom which he had undergone, and promised himself that he, perhaps, would not hesitate 
someday to call it to account.” 
 
Fortunately for Sankoh, he got recruited and taken to Libya by a Pan-African Union 
(PANAFU) member Victor Ebiyemi Reider, “a high school drop-out who was active in 
Freetown´s revolutionary circles in the late 1970s.”50 He discovered Sankoh in the diamond 
areas of Sierra Leone (Abdallah 2004: 54). Abdallah further went to state that “perhaps, the 
greatest tragedy of the revolution has to do with the fact that those who recruited Sankoh 
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The Liberia factor 
 
This section discusses the nexus “between the conflicts in Sierra Leone and Liberia and the 
role played by Charles Taylor and his NPFL”52 in helping the RUF begin its insurgency in 
Sierra Leone. Taylor was an Americo-Liberian with Gola roots (his mother was reported to 
have Gola roots) who partly studied in Liberia and the United States of America (Youboty 
1993:190). Just as he returned to Liberia a coup d’états53 took place on April 12, 1980 that 
saw the death of President William Tolbert, his son A.B. Tolbert and several members of his 
government. The People Redemption Council (PRC) was formed with Master Sergeant 
Samuel Kanyon Doe becoming the head of state of Liberia (Youboty 1993: 41). Taylor was 
appointed the Director-General of the General Services Agency (GSA).   
 
In 1983, Charles Taylor was transferred from his position as Director-General of the GSA to 
the Commerce Ministry as an assistant minister. Unfortunately for him, the new General 
Services Agency (GSA) boss, Clarence Momolu, ordered an audit of his predecessor’s 
transactions before fully assuming the portfolio. During the audit, it was discovered that about 
$900,000 was unaccounted for during Taylor’s incumbency. This led to the summon of the 
former GSA boss by the audit committee for his side of the story. But rather than facing the 
audit committee and possibly finding himself in a state of public disgrace, the ostentatious 
Taylor absconded Liberia. He later reappeared in the United States where he was arrested for 
extradition upon request by the Liberian government (Youboty 1993:76).  
 
In what remained to be a mystery to many, Taylor escaped from prison. While many accounts 
have surfaced on how he escaped, he himself stated during cross examination at the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone that he was assisted by the US government to escape. “With his prison 
cell unlocked by a US prison guard late one night in November 1985, Taylor walked out of 
the maximum security area of the Plymouth County Correctional Facility in Massachusetts.” 
Taylor said (while testifying at the Special Court for Sierra Leone in The Hague) “he was 
escorted by the same guard to the minimum security area.  Tying a sheet to a window, Taylor 
climbed out the window and over the prison fence, where a car containing two men was 
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waiting to whisk him to New York” (OSJI 2009).54  
 
Not much was heard from him after this period. However, it has been alleged that he was in 
Libya being trained by the forces of Muammar Gaddafi. “Qaddafi’s motivation for supporting 
Taylor was part vengeful and part strategic.”55  The Libyan leader “wanted to get back at the 
United States for frustrating Libya’s efforts to extend its influence across the Middle East and 
Africa.”56  In particular, “he wanted to get even for U.S. pressure on Liberia to sever its ties 
with Libya. Liberia had been a tight U.S. ally in the Cold War, hosting a large Voice of 
America (VOA) radio transmitting facility and reportedly an important CIA electronic 
listening post.”57   
 
 In late 1989, “the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by Charles Taylor, 
launched a rebellion against the Doe government from neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire, an 
incident that signaled the genesis of a brutal and bloody conflict.” “The rebel group was 
initially small with a total number of 186 members of mostly ill-trained and ill-equipped 
soldiers.”58 However, “within a period of six months, this once small number increased to 
more than ten thousand, and had speedily captured a substantial amount of Liberian territory, 
including strategic locations such as the country’s second largest city and port, Buchana. On 
11 September 1990, ten years after Doe came to power, he met with his death. Doe had been 
invited to a meeting with Prince Johnson in the camp of ECOMOG. His bodyguards were 
disarmed at the gate and as they entered the facility they were attacked by forces of Johnson 
who snatched President Doe and later killed him. Prince Johnson was a former high level 
commander in Taylor’s NPFL, but had subsequently formed his own splinter group called the 
Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia.”59 The war in Liberia continued with brutal 
intensity and on the 23rd of March 1991 there was a spill over into Sierra Leone.  
 
When the war in Sierra Leone started all fingers pointed to Charles Taylor as the key 
supporter of the RUF. The questions asked by Sierra Leoneans were “what is the motivating 
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factor for Taylor to support a war against Sierra Leone? What have Sierra Leoneans done to 
him?60 
 
It was recalled that on 1st November 1990 Taylor had made explicit threats in an interview 
over the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), to attack and destroy Freetown’s airport. 
He argued that “by allowing its territory to be used by the West African Intervention Force, 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Peace Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG), Sierra Leone had robbed him of the final fruit of his invasion -the Presidency of 
Liberia” (Koroma 1996: 140). Also, according to Koroma (1996: 142), a secret history 
serving as further motivation for the invasion existed. Prior to the initiation of conflict in 
Liberia, Charles Taylor and three companions reportedly travelling on Burkinabe passports 
had, sometime in early 1989 entered Sierra Leone and sought audience with President 
Momoh. The purpose was to seek the President′s endorsement for the use of Sierra Leone’s 
territory as a route for the invasion of Liberia. Discussions on the issue were held between 
Charles Taylor and a highly placed official in the President′s office. Coupled with this, a 
substantial amount of money changed hands to secure approval of Taylor′s request. This was 
rejected by the President whose memory of a previous failed military attempt by Thomas 
Quiwonkpa against President Doe was still fresh. The money which the President reportedly 
never saw was nonetheless never returned. Taylor was arrested and placed at the Pademba 
Road Maximum Security Prison. When Doe heard of this he sent a delegation to seek his 
extradition but Taylor and the others with him were given a safe passage out of the country 
through Guinea (Koroma: 1996: 142).  
 
Taylor had to turn to La Cote d’Ivoire for an entry point into Liberia61 as the Sierra Leoneans 
were not cooperative. Consequently, Sierra Leone further went into the bad books of Taylor as 
he was at that time working with elements from Sierra Leone to eventually destabilize the 
country.   
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3.2 Factions involved in the conflict  
 
There were several factions involved in the war in Sierra Leone. Some of these factions 
(AFRC, Kamajors and West Side Boys) became involved as the war progressed. These 
factions are discussed below:  
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 
 The RUF was the first insurgency group in Sierra Leone and they remained part of the 
conflict until the end. According to Ibrahim Abdallah (2004: 56) “the RUF was a peculiar 
organisation. It did not share any of the essential characteristics of ideology, organization 
and discipline which marked revolutionary movements in Africa and elsewhere, except for the 
use of force to attain power.” This was obvious from the way they pursued the war as they 
lacked a political strategy that could convince people of their intentions. At the start, the RUF 
sent propaganda messages of wanting to liberate the country from the APC but with time it 
became obvious that they were not faithful to their initial promises. They started committing 
atrocities against those they claimed they wanted to liberate.  
Initially, the RUF was composed of three distinct groups: “those who had acquired military 
training in Libya (predominantly urban lumpens) and had seen action with the NPFL as 
combatants; a second group of Sierra Leoneans, resident in Liberia, mostly lumpens62 and 
others of different categories including foreign fighters and criminals” (Abdallah 2004:57). 
This number grew with time as the people who were in the South-Eastern parts of Sierra 
Leone felt marginalized by the APC and wanted to see it lose power. There are allegations of 
families providing their children to become part of the RUF as a move to rid the country off 
the Momoh government.63 
The report of a survey conducted by Humphrey and Weinstein (2003:18) titled “What the 
Fighters Say" stated that 50-60% of the members of the RUF were Mendes while 20% were 
Temnes. The report also stated that at the end of the war 24, 338 members of the RUF were 
registered with the NCDDR.64  
Corporal Foday Sankoh was the head of the group but after his arrest in Nigeria in 1996, Sam 
Bockarie alias Mosquito temporarily assumed leadership until the return of Sankoh. In 2000 
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there was a divorce between Bockarie and Sankoh which led to the former leaving Sierra 
Leone to join Charles Taylor in Liberia. After Sankoh was arrested after the 8th of May 2000 
incident65 Issa Sesay became the head of the group until he was indicted by the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone.  
 
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) 
On the 25th of May 1997 some soldiers of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) staged a coup d’états. 
The announcer of the coup d’états Corporal Tamba Gborie stated in the speech announcing 
the coup that the army was dissatisfied with the way they were treated by the government. He 
particularly stated that the government prioritized the Kamajors (a civil defense militia) over 
the army as the coordinator of the Kamajors was the Deputy Minister of Defense.66  
Major Johnny Paul Koroma was taken out of the Pademba Road Maximum Security Prison, 
named the Chairman of the regime and sworn in as the head of state of Sierra Leone.67 Major 
Koroma named Foday Sankoh the deputy leader of the regime and the deputy head of state. 
And a marriage was formed between the AFRC and the RUF. However, at this point, Foday 
Sankoh had been arrested in Nigeria68 so he was represented by Sam Bockarie, the temporal 
head of the RUF.  
For the first time since the inception of the war, the RUF gained entrance into Freetown and 
the people of Freetown some of whom69 had never had the true taste of the conflict watched in 
surprise as they saw the RUF moving into Freetown. There was widespread condemnation of 
the coup within and outside Sierra Leone. Organisations such as the United Nations, 
Organisation for African Unity (OAU), Commonwealth and ECOWAS sent strong words to 
the regime asking them to give way to the democratic process that had started in the country.  
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The regime was not prepared to listen, despite the fact that they met with representatives of 
the Kabba government in exile and the international community in Conakry, Guinea. This 
meeting was geared towards developing a road map for the return to democracy.70 It became 
obvious after the Conakry Peace Accord71 failed that the AFRC had to be forcefully taken out. 
In February 1998, ECOMOG, Kamajors and SLAs loyal to the Kabba government in exile 
forced the AFRC/RUF from Freetown72. AFRC/RUF fighters looted and vandalized 
communities as they made their way out of the city.  
It became obvious that a significant portion of the army was not loyal to Kabba. On his return 
Kabba exacerbated the situation by announcing the disbandment of the army as he had lost 
faith in them. This led to many soldiers believing that Kabba was out for revenge. 
Interviewees who were part of the army then stated that this led them into joining those in the 
bush as they no longer had any option. Thus, the SLA took a new role in the conflict as their 
marriage with the RUF continued in the bush.  
The AFRC like the other factions violently pursued their war efforts. This created fear and 
tension among Sierra Leoneans who started running away from the provinces to Freetown to 
seek a safe haven as the RUF/SLA remobilized for an onslaught across the country.  
On the 6th of January 1999 AFRC and RUF staged a major attack on Freetown. The attack on 
the city left thousands of people dead, amputated, mutilated or raped with over 7000 homes 
burnt. It was the biggest attack ever in the war and it changed the course of the war as the 
government and the international community started thinking of seriously discussing peace 
with the RUF instead of pursuing the war. It was evident that the government could not 
militarily defeat the AFRC/RUF.  Thus, the AFRC became a key player during the Lome 
Peace Agreement with their leader Johnny Paul Koroma given the position of chairman of the 
Council for the Consolidation of Peace (the council derived its mandate from the Lome Peace 
Agreement).  
At the end of the conflict, AFRC like the other factions went through DDR. 8869 AFRC 
soldiers were disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated (Humphreys and Weinstein 2004:13). 
When the SCSL was set up, some of the leaders of the AFRC - Johnny Paul Koroma, Alex 
Tamba Brima, Ibrahim Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu - were indicted for War 
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Crimes, Crimes against Humanity and Violations of International Humanitarian Law73 by the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone. Johnny Paul Koroma fled the city before he was arrested and 
Alex Tamba Brima, Ibrahim Bazzy and Santigie Borbor Kamara received 50, 45, 50 years jail 
sentences respectively.  
 
Civil Defence Force (CDF) 
The CDF consisted of different groups such as the Kamajors (from the South-East), Gbethis 
and Kapras (from the North), Tamabros (Korankos from the North) and Donsos (from the 
East).74 All of them initially75 consisted of traditional hunters who wanted to protect their 
communities from the RUF. The Kamajors was the largest and the main CDF during the 
conflict. Much more is known of them than of the other groups as the others were only active 
in their communities.  
The Kamajors was a “grass roots” militia that was reputed to have magical powers that 
rendered them powerful with their bodies being “bullet proof”. They were to “abide by many 
rules, the consequences of breaking the rules was destruction of the bullet proofing.76 One of 
the rules was not to touch a woman” (Marcus 2009: 1). In some communities they were seen 
as immortal with stories circulating of their mystical powers. The various groupings of armed 
militias that became known as the Kamajors can be traced back to the hunters, or 
Kamajoisia,
77 of local communities in the South-Eastern parts of Sierra Leone. The 
Kamajoisia supposedly possessed specialized knowledge and were tasked with using this 
knowledge in the protection of their communities against all dangers of the forest (Taylor 
2012: 6).78 
 
The Kamajors became very influential and started playing a leading role after Ahmad Tejan 
Kabba became president in 1996. Their coordinator Chief Sam Hinga Norman was appointed 
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into the cabinet of Kabba (Deputy Defence Minister) and this further augmented the status of 
the Kamajors.  
 
The role played by the Kamajors have been viewed with mixed feeling with some people 
looking at them as heroes while others have characterised them as villains. Hassan Kamara, a 
resident of Moyamba, accused the Kamajors of attacking innocent civilians, looting food and 
property “I witnessed on many occasions lootings and killings done by the Kamajors. In most 
cases they attacked and killed people that were not from the Mende tribe. This gave the war a 
certain tribal edge that it previously did not have.” 
 
This view was expressed mostly by interviewees from the North who were in the South-
Eastern regions of the country during the conflict. Atrocities committed were coupled with 
carnages committed against women who were seen as ‘war rations’ (Marcus 2009:1). 
However, Taylor (2012:1) argued that rather than a predatory, greed-based group who 
practiced forced recruitment, the Kamajors displayed a very nuanced and changing political 
motivation, based primarily on notions of community defence with an intimidating and 
complex relationship with local communities. 
 
At the end of the conflict 37, 216 Kamajors went through DDR (Humphreys and Weinstein 
2004: 13) while some were reported to have auto-demobilized.79 Most of the Kamajors went 
back to their communities of origin unlike the other fighting forces. However, like the RUF 
and the AFRC, the Kamajors were also indicted by the SCSL for war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and violations of international humanitarian laws. Those indicted were Chief Sam 
Hinga Norman80 (the National Coordinator), Allieu Kondowa (High Priest) and Moinina 
Fofana (director of the force and the leading general).  
 
Specific charges included “unlawful killings, physical violence, looting and burning, 
terrorizing the civilian population and collective punishments and use of child soldiers.”81 
Chief Sam Hinga Norman died during the course of his trial and Moinina Fofana and Allieu 
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Kondowa were sentenced by the court to six and eight years imprisonment respectively and 
are currently appealing their sentences. 
West Side Boys 
The West Side Boys was a faction that broke away from the AFRC. It emerged after the 
January 1999 invasion of Freetown and consisted mostly of young soldiers. According to Utas 
and Jorgel (2008: 492) the West Side Boys were “children of soldiers that grew up in the 
Wilberforce Barracks in Freetown”82 and that “a partial explanation for the name ‘West Side 
Boys’ was their background in the Western Area of Sierra Leone.”83 Moreover, “many had 
been based at the barracks in Western Freetown (chiefly Wilberforce but also Juba and 
Cockrill). The main reason for the ‘West Side’ name was, however, the music of the 
American rapper Tupac Shakur.”84 
 
Tupac Shakur had influence over many young people in Sierra Leone and the most popular of 
his songs that were heard all over the country included Hit them up, Me Against the World, 
All Eyes on Me and Only God Can Judge Me. The anger and frustration that Shakur sang 
with permeated some young people of Sierra Leone who came to see him as a revolutionist 
who stood up for the downtrodden. The West Side Boys appeared to be deeply touched by the 
messages of Shakur and apart from listening to his songs they continued fighting against the 
system.  
 
Santigie Marrah, formerly of the West Side Boys, explained the influence of the songs of 
Shakur on the West Side Boys “We listened to the songs of Tupac all the time, we drank 
alcohol, smoked marijuana and danced. Basically, he was like a prophet to us. Shakur was to 
us what Bob Marley is to others. We thought that the whole world was against us and all we 
could do was to fight back.” 
 
Momoh Conteh85 believed that the love Junior Lion had for Tupac had influence on the 
coinage of the name ‘West Side Boys‘. Junior Lion was one of the key leaders of the group 
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and he was the “commander of the Dark Angel Battalion.”86 After the West Side Boys 
(alongside the RUF/AFRC) got removed from Freetown, the West Side Boys stationed 
themselves at the outskirts of Freetown. Okra Hill became one of their main stations. They 
continued attacking the localities closer to them even after the Lome Peace Agreement was 
signed.  
 
According to Human Rights Watch (2003:14), “at the behest of Johnny Paul Koroma, the 
West Side Boys in May 2000 briefly fought on the government’s side to prevent the RUF 
from re-entering Freetown. However, they continued to commit human rights abuses, and in 
August 2000 abducted eleven British soldiers of the International Military Advisory and 
Training Team (IMATT) and one SLA officer. In September 2000, the West Side Boys bases 
were destroyed during an operation by British paratroopers to free the captured soldiers. 
Numerous West Side Boys, including their leader (Foday Kallay), were arrested and 
incarcerated.”87 However, most of them including Foday Kallay have been released from the 
Pademba Road prison. 
3.3 Recruitment patterns  
 
Two major forms of recruitment were common in Sierra Leone, voluntary or forced 
recruitment. At the start of the conflict, there was a high rate of volunteerism but this 
dwindled as the conflict continued and the RUF started attacking innocent people. Common 
factors that encouraged people to volunteer included poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, 
revenge, belief in the ideology of the RUF, desire to get rid of the APC government and peer 
pressure.88 
Of all the factors stated above, poverty, unemployment and the desire to get rid of the APC 
became the most stated factors during interviews conducted for this study. Traditional leaders 
in the South-East were said by some interviewees to have provided their children to be 
soldiers in the RUF. They believed that the war was to get rid of the APC and bring back the 
SLPP, a party of their choice that was dissolved when Sierra Leone became a one-party state 
in 1978. A significant percentage of the CDF volunteered to be combatants. For them, they 
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wanted to protect themselves and their communities and also to re-install the SLPP (after it 
was overthrown in 1997 by the AFRC). Those who volunteered were seen as real men in their 
communities while those who refused to join were seen as unmanly. This may have put 
pressure on many in the affected areas especially young people who formed the bulk of the 
CDF.  
Of the 140 interviewees, 63 volunteered to be fighters while 77% were abducted (this was the 
case mostly for those who were with the RUF/AFRC/West Side Boys). Reasons why the 
fighting forces abducted people included: to have fighters, load carriers, cooks, spies and sex 
slaves. All the fighting forces recruited children and, when interviewed, former middle level 
commanders stated that children were easier to deal with, became very loyal after being 
conscientized, rarely thought of running away, were very fierce fighters that people were 
scared of and they did not care about dying.  
These factors are similar to what Romeo Dallaire (2010) wrote “In conflicts around the world, 
there is an increasingly popular weapon system that needs negligible technology, is simple to 
sustain, has unlimited versatility, and an incredible capacity for both loyalty and barbarism. 
What are these cheap, renewable, plentiful, sophisticated, and expendable weapons? 
Children.” Dallaire identified these factors as key to the recruitment of children in conflicts 
around the world. Other African countries where children have been recruited for similar 
reasons include the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Liberia, 
Republic of Sudan, Republic of South Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, Nigeria, Mozambique, Mali, 
Cote d‘Ivoire and Angola.  
An effective method used by the forces to get fighters become loyal to their course was to 
have them commit atrocities in their local communities. This created a sense of fear and non-
desire to return on the part of the combatants. This had serious psycho-social implications on 
those who were made to commit such atrocities. Several years after the conflict some fighters 
could still not see themselves going to their communities of origin.  
Like children, women were also sought by the forces especially the RUF  and the AFRC/West 
Side Boys. Key reasons why they were abducted included to serve as sex slaves, combatants, 
spies, cooks and load carriers. Victoria Kanneh89 a former RUF abductee stated in an 
interview “I was made to do many things while with the RUF. I started as a cook, became a 
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spy and later the wife of our local commander.” Like Kanneh, Isatu Jalloh90 who was 
abducted by the West Side Boys on the 20th of January 1999 served in various roles ´I was a 
load carrier (ammunitions) when we left Freetown but was trained to shoot and carry a gun 
when we reached Masiaka.”    
In the entire period of the war abduction formed the main source of recruitment as the 
different forces wanted a regular source of recruiting fighters. For most of them (with the 
exception of the Kamajors) there was a very slim possibility to get volunteers as people 
became scared of them and the way they were pursing their war efforts. In particular, this was 
the case after the January 1999 attack on Freetown. The focus changed from seeking to recruit 
more fighters to maintaining those that were already in the fighting forces. By then many 
fighters were tired of fighting and wanted to find a way out of the conflict.91 
3.4 Peace Agreements 
 
In the quest for peace in Sierra Leone three peace agreements were signed. These peace 
agreements are the Abidjan, Conakry and Lome peace agreements.  
Abidjan Peace Agreement 
After three years of NPRC rule and with no sign of peace in sight, civil society actors and 
political parties92 organised a National Consultative Conference at the Bintumani Hotel in 
Freetown.93 This consultative conference was geared towards setting a road map to peace (as 
the war was ill-pursued with the rebels gaining grounds everyday) and democracy. Captain 
Strasser promised to move the country towards a democratic path-way and set-up a time table 
for election.  
However, as plans were unfolding there was a palace coup d’états on the 16th of January 1996 
which saw Brigadier Julius Maada Bio94 succeeding Captain Valentine Esegrabo Melvin 
Strasser as head of state and chairman of the NPRC.  Captain Strasser was sent into exile in 
Guinea. 
With the support of the International Community Bio initiated talks with the RUF. The talks 
progressed with the RUF eventually meeting with NPRC officials in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire. 
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This was the first time in the course of the war that Sierra Leoneans saw Foday Sankoh on 
national TV. To most of them he was only a mythical subject. In between the talks elections95 
were held in Sierra Leone.96 The SLPP won the election with their flag bearer Ahmad Tejan 
Kabba becoming president. Upon assuming the presidency he continued the Abidjan talks 
with the RUF.  
Subsequently, the Abidjan Peace Agreement was signed on the 30th of November 1996. It 
consisted of 28 articles that made provision for cessation of hostilities, establishment of a 
Council for the Consolidation of Peace, the establishment of a disarmament, demobilization 
and reintegration of former combatants programme, security sector reform and other elements 
of post-war reconstruction. The OAU, ECOWAS, UN and Commonwealth served as moral 
guarantors. 
However, it “became obvious shortly after the agreement was signed that the RUF was not 
committed to it. Sankoh refused to send representatives to the critical demobilization and 
disarmament committee, thereby undermining the work of the Peace Commission, and 
making it difficult for the government to proceed with the disarmament process. He also 
refused to meet with UN representatives in Cote d’Ivoire, and opposed the decision to send a 
720-member United Nations peacekeeping force to help secure the peace. He called instead 
for a smaller force of 50 to 60 members.” (Bangura 1999:1).97 With Sankoh now appearing to 
be a spoiler of the peace process (and with the belief that his removal will help the peace 
process) he was arrested and detained in Nigeria in March 1997. It was alleged that he was 
caught with a pistol at the airport but it was obvious that General Sani Abacha was supporting 
the efforts of Tejan Kabba to end to the conflict.  
The arrest of Sankoh created tension within RUF as they became divided on the direction the 
movement should take. The leaders in Freetown that were part of the Commission for the 
Consolidation of Peace (led by Philip Palmer, Ibrahim Deen Jalloh and Fayia Musa), wanted 
the RUF to respect the peace accord while those in the bush (led by Sam Bockarie and Issa 
Sesay) did not want the RUF to take this position. Subsequently, “those in the bush got the 
upper hand when seven senior RUF officials, including two commissioners of the CCP, and 
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Sierra Leone's ambassador to Guinea were abducted.”98 The “two commissioners were on an 
official mission to hold consultations with RUF members in Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Ivory 
Coast. They were kidnapped as soon as they arrived in RUF-controlled territory at Nongowa, 
in Kailahun District.”99 Eventually, the seven senior RUF officials were killed. 
 This saw Sam Bockarie emerging as the temporal head of the RUF, the complete collapse of 
the Abidjan Peace Agreement with the country pushed again into another phase of violence. 
Conakry Peace Agreement  
As stated in chapter 3.2 the Conakry Peace Agreement is a product of the May 25th 1997 coup 
d’états of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). It was principally geared 
towards making provision for the transfer of power to Tejan Kabba who was in exile in 
Guinea.  
After serious engagement by the International Community, the AFRC regime decided to meet 
with the government in exile in Conakry, Guinea. This was preceded by the formation of a 
Committee of Five set up by ECOWAS to ensure the smooth transition to democracy. The 
Peace Plan made provision for  “an immediate ceasefire - Kabbah's re-instatement by 23 April 
1998, but with a "broadening" of his power base to reflect the interests of all parties, 
Continued UN and ECOWAS embargoes on arms, fuel, and travel by members of the AFRC, 
Disarmament and integration of the armed groups competing for power from 1 December 
1997, Commencement of humanitarian assistance operations from 15 November 1997, 
Repatriation of refugees from 1 December 1997, Immunity from prosecution for the May 
coup leaders’ (IRIN 1998). The Committee of Five also agreed with the AFRC that RUF 
leader Foday Sankoh, imprisoned in Nigeria, should be released and allowed to return to 
Sierra Leone to "contribute" to the peace process.”100 
However, shortly after the signing of the agreement it became clear that there was a lack of 
trust the AFRC and the government in exile. Johnny Paul Koroma in several interviews stated 
that Sankoh should be released immediately, that the timeline for DDR was not realistic, the 
national army should not be disarmed and that the Nigerians were not neutral and AFRC 
forces should not surrender to them.  Kabba on the other hand hinted that he was not properly 
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consulted on the agreement with the AFRC, he further revoked the amnesty granted to the 
AFRC and he stated in an interview that “he would be compelled to punish the AFRC leaders 
in ‘exemplary fashion.”101  
Supporters of the government in exile believed that the AFRC was buying time to further 
entrench their government and was not prepared to hand over power to Kabba. Colonel 
Samaila Dadinkowa the then Aide de Camp (ADC) to Brigadier Maxwell Khobe (head of the 
ECOMOG contingent in Sierra Leone and later head of the Sierra Leone Army) had this to 
say when interviewed:102 “As the different parties were gathering in Conakry to develop and 
sign the peace plan, military intelligence learnt that Johnny Paul Koroma already had a four 
year governance plan that was being prepared. We also got information that the AFRC 
leadership that was in Conakry felt intimidated by the Committee of 5 and by Chief Tom 
Ikimi. So they signed for the sake of signing, they wanted to buy time to stabilise their 
government and turn Sierra Leoneans to their side. What they did not realise was that many 
Sierra Leoneans were no longer prepared to be ruled by a military regime.” 
The Kamajors became frustrated by the lack of progress made with the peace plan and they 
started attacking AFRC positions in the South-East of the country. In February 1998, 
ECOMOG, soldiers loyal to the Kabba government with the support of a private British 
security firm Sandline attacked Freetown and chased the AFRC out of power. Kabbah was 
restored on the 10th of March 1998 and a trial process was immediately initiated for the AFRC 
officials that were arrested. 24103 senior leaders of the AFRC were executed on the 19th of 
October 1998 while others were undergoing treason trial.104 They were released from prison 
when the AFRC/RUF overran Freetown on the 6th of January 1999.   
Lome Peace Agreement 
The war intensified across Sierra Leone after the AFRC was removed from Freetown by 
ECOMOG and forces loyal to Kabba. However, this strengthened the marriage between them 
and the RUF and after few months they started marching towards Freetown. The AFRC/RUF 
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gained the upper hand against the SLA and ECOMOG as there was a deep divide between the 
two. A senior officer105 in ECOMOG then stated “Within the Nigerian army Maxwell Khobe 
was a junior officer to ECOMOG commanders like Gen Abu Amadu that were in Freetown. 
However, he was promoted to the rank of Brigadier General by Sani Abacha and became the 
Chief of Defense Staff of the Sierra Leone Army due to an arrangement between Abacha and 
Kabba. Abu Amadu and others were not happy to see themselves working directly with Khobe 
as equals. So the relationship between SLA and ECOMOG became sour. This was most 
crucial in the area of intelligence exchange. Most of the intelligence sources sent to 
ECOMOG by Khobe and his team were ignored by ECOMOG. RUF/SLA took advantage of 
this gap and fastened their move on Freetown.” 
Subsequently, the rebels were able to navigate their way into Freetown on the 6th of January 
1999. This was the worst attack in the history of the war; it was a mix of the attacking forces 
wanting to take control of the city and at the same time revenging on the general populace for 
supporting ECOMOG against the AFRC regime. Apart from the attack on civilians several 
Nigerian soldiers that were caught behind enemy lines were also killed by the rebels.  
Col. Samaila Dadinkowa stated “Soldiers had to be brought from Nigeria to help us take back 
the city. For us the Congo Cross Bridge was the cut-off point. If the rebels had passed that 
point it would have been difficult to remove them from the city. They would have also caused 
a lot of havoc in the Western areas of the city. We started pushing them back when we 
received reinforcement. It was very tough but we succeeded amidst the loss of lives and 
properties.” 
After retaking the city, it became obvious to the government of Sierra Leone and the 
International Community that the joint forces of ECOMOG, SLA and Kamajors would not be 
able to militarily defeat the RUF/SLA. Also, the position of the Nigerians was changing, Sani 
Abacha who was supporting the war effort in Sierra Leone passed away and Nigeria started 
the transition to democracy. The people of Nigeria were also tired of seeing their relatives 
dying in Sierra Leone. Also, more than 70% of the country was under the grip of the rebels. 
The only way out for Kabba was to go to the diplomatic table and discuss peace with the 
belligerent factions.  
                                                          
105 Telephone interview conducted on the 17th of February 2013. 
44 
 
The peace effort was supported by the Clinton administration that sent in their Special Envoy 
to Africa Rev. Jesse Jackson106 to meet with Kabba. Kabba went with Jackson to Lome where 
they held discussions with Foday Sankoh on “18 May 1999 under the auspices of President 
Gnassingbe Eyadema.”107 The discussion led to the signing of a cease-fire agreement that 
paved the way for the dialogue that commenced on the May 25 1999 which led to the 
developing and signing of the Lome Peace Agreement on 7 July 1999. 
The Lome Peace Agreement had 37 articles and they mostly included the provisions made in 
the Abidjan Peace Agreement which are: cessation of hostilities, establishment of a Council 
for the Consolidation of Peace, design and implementation of a disarmament, demobilization 
and reintegration of former combatants programme, security sector reform and other elements 
of post-war reconstruction. Article 26 made provision for the setting up of a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to address the violations of human rights, Article 5 made 
provision for the inclusion of the RUF into a government of National Unity with Foday 
Sankoh given the following positions: 
“The Chairmanship of the Board of the Commission for the Management of Strategic 
Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (CMRRD) as provided for in Article 
VII of the present Agreement shall be offered to the leader of the RUF/SL, Corporal Foday 
Sankoh. For this purpose he shall enjoy the status of Vice President and shall therefore be 
answerable only to the President of Sierra Leone.”108 
 Article 9 granted amnesty to Foday Sankoh109 and members of the different factions as could 
be seen below: 
1. “In order to bring lasting peace to Sierra Leone, the Government of Sierra Leone shall take 
appropriate legal steps to grant Corporal Foday Sankoh absolute and free pardon. 
2. After the signing of the present Agreement, the Government of Sierra Leone shall also 
grant absolute and free pardon and reprieve to all combatants and collaborators in respect of 
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anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives, up to the time of the signing of the 
present Agreement.”110 
The amnesty was for crimes committed from the inception of the war to the time the 
agreement was signed. The United Nations was against the amnesty clause as it does not 
recognise amnesty provided for crimes committed during the conflict. In as much as Francis 
Okelo “the UN representative signed the agreement so as not to derail the process he added a 
caveat that the UN will not recognise the amnesty.”111  
Like the Abidjan Peace Agreement, the Lome Peace Agreement was faced with several 
challenges. The RUF became antagonistic towards the Peacekeepers as the Special 
Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations reported: 
“From its induction in Sierra Leone, Sankoh had displayed an antagonism which proved 
implacable to the UN Mission (UNAMSIL). He denounced its deployment as illegal and 
inconsistent with the Lomé Agreement, done without his agreement and threatening to his 
party. Every effort made to explain the link between UNAMSIL and Article XVI of the Lomé 
Agreement was met with pretence at understanding only for UNAMSIL to be denounced again 
shortly thereafter. With that posture, RUF obstructed UNAMSIL from deployment throughout 
the country, protection of innocent Sierra Leoneans and others from gross violation of their 





 It appeared that Sankoh was looking at the peacekeepers as inimical to his desire to 
ultimately take power in Sierra Leone.  The RUF continued causing mayhem and finally 
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overstepped itself when it took 500 UN peacekeepers hostage on the 1st of May 2000. While 
this was going on the RUF started marching towards Freetown for a final onslaught. 
However, they were stopped by elements of the AFRC/West Side Boys. This frustrated the 
people of Sierra Leone who were totally fed-up with the pranks of Sankoh. On 8 May 2000 
civil society mobilised the populace for a demonstration at his Spur Road residence. Sankoh’s 
security guards opened fire on them killing about 18 people. Despite this, the people were 
able to reach his residence and vandalized it. Sankoh escaped but was arrested and detained 
few days later. 
To put a complete end to the hostilities and to resuscitate the Lome Peace Agreement RUF 
was encouraged by leaders of ECOWAS to come up with a new leadership. It should be noted 
that before the 8 May incident Sam Bockarie had left Sierra Leone (after falling apart with 
Foday Sankoh) with some of his fighters for Liberia. Thus, General Issa Sesay became the 
new leader of the RUF. He met with officials of ECOWAS and the government of Sierra 
Leone in Abuja, Nigeria on 10 November 2000 to sign a cease-fire agreement. Sesay 
developed a good working relationship with the government and the ECOWAS Committee of 
Six and also showed his commitment towards bringing lasting peace to Sierra Leone. This 
paved the way for a smooth DDR process with the RUF fully participating. 
 
3.5 Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants  
 
The DDR process in Sierra Leone went through three phases. Phase one was initiated after the 
reinstatement of the Kabba regime in 1998. Phase II was a result of the Lome Peace 
Agreement. Phase III was initiated after the Abuja Agreement (Sesay 2010).  
Phase 1: DDR 
As indicated above, in 1998 ECOMOG and the remaining loyalists within the Sierra Leone 
Army removed AFRC after a very intensive battle kicked the AFRC regime from Freetown. 
The government ceased the window of opportunity to encourage combatants to come forward 
and disarm. About 5000 combatants went through the process and they were kept in places 
such as the National Stadium in Freetown that served as disarmament and demobilization 
sites.113 Most of those who disarmed were former soldiers of the army who joined the AFRC. 
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“Of the 5000 only about 3,200 combatants were disarmed and these were mainly ex-Sierra 
Leone Army (SLA)/AFRC who surrendered to ECOMOG (2,994 AFRC and ex-SLA; 187 
RUF; and 2 CDF). Of this total number, about 189 were child soldiers”114 (Zongwe 2002: 2). 
A targeted approach was used with the eligibility criteria based on the possession of and 
ability to deal with a weapon: to dismantle and assemble it. As this could only be done by 
actual fighters it excluded those who played support roles (cooks, sex slaves, spies, load 
carriers etc.) and dependents who relied on the combatants for survival.   
 The programme was halted when Freetown was attacked on the 6th of January 1999 by the 
RUF/AFRC. Most of those who were in the assembly sites escaped for their lives; joined the 
RUF/AFRC fighters or were killed.  
 
Phase II 
Article 16 of the Lome Peace Agreement made provision for a DDR programme. It stated:   
“1. A neutral peace keeping force comprising UNOMSIL and ECOMOG shall disarm all 
combatants of the RUF/SL, CDF, SLA and paramilitary groups. The encampment, 
disarmament and demobilization process shall commence within six weeks of the signing of 
the present Agreement in line with the deployment of the neutral peace keeping force. 
2. The present SLA shall be restricted to the barracks and their arms in the armoury and their 
ammunitions in the magazines and placed under constant surveillance by the neutral 
peacekeeping force during the process of disarmament and demobilization. 
3. UNOMSIL shall be present in all disarmament and demobilization locations to monitor the 
process and provide security guarantees to all ex-combatants.”115 
While the provisions made are not very detailed on the economic and social aspects of the 
proposed programme, it was very clear in the area of political reintegration. The RUF was 
promised political inclusion and transformation into a political party. Also, as stated in the 
Agreement (1999) “The Chairmanship of the Board of the Commission for the Management 
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of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (CMRRD) as provided for 
in Article VII of the present Agreement shall be offered to the leader of the RUF/SLA, 
Corporal Foday Sankoh. For this purpose he shall enjoy the status of Vice President and 
shall therefore be answerable only to the President of Sierra Leone.” 
The agreement reaffirmed in its preamble the imperative to end hostilities as a basis for 
transition to sustainable peace, democracy and development. Following this resolution, the 
parties agreed in part one to the cessation of hostilities, and established a Ceasefire 
Monitoring Committee (CMC) and a Joint Monitoring Commission (JMC) to oversee its 
effective implementation (Omotola 2008:38). Phase II of DDR was launched “in October 
1999, as indicated in the Lomé peace agreement, with financial support from a Multi-Donor 
Trust Fund (MDTF) as well as by Emergency Recovery Credits and a Post-Conflict Fund 
grant (CICS 2008:7). The eligibility criteria were the same as those used in Phase I.”116 
Many setbacks were faced and they included “initial non-compliance with peace agreements, 
programme restructuring, etc.” (UNOSAA 2005: 23).117 The RUF appeared to be dissatisfied 
and recalcitrant; this became obvious when they started attacking, abducting and killing 
United Nations peacekeepers. This was compounded with “institutional gaps, combined with 
a crippling post-conflict economic, social and political environment which provided the 
backdrop to the DDR programme. Poor governance systems at the central and local levels 
created a context within which other conflict factors flourished, for example, disgruntlement 
of unemployed youth and former combatants.”118  
Further discussions among the different stakeholders led to another ceasefire agreement in 
Abuja, Nigeria on the 10th of November 2010. The agreement recommitted the RUF and the 
other factions to the cessation of hostilities and the DDR programme. The DDR commission 
with the support of the international community recommenced the programme. This phase is 
known as Phase III.  
Phase III 
Phase III is the most significant of all the DDR stages in Sierra Leone. Led by the National 
Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants 
(NCDDR), it was supported by the UN Peacekeeping Force that was the largest number ever 
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deployed in a country by then (the force eventually amounted to over 17,000 personnel). 
“71,000 combatants, including around 7,000 children (under 18 years old) were disarmed and 
demobilized in Sierra Leone.”119 The eligibility criteria were broadened during this phase with 
the NCDDR seen working with the different stakeholders to ensure that those who played 
support roles and the dependents of former combatants go through DDR and benefit from the 
assistance provided. Despite this, a significant number were still excluded as DDR 
implementers in the field had their own criteria that excluded mostly women and children. 
Phase III will be divided into the different stages (Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration) to ensure clarity on the implementation process.  
The table below shows the stages in which the programme strategy was developed. 
Table 1: 











Aim  Disarmament of all 
groups in order to 
strengthen security and 
facilitate return to civilian 
life and the authority of 
government  
Recognition of former 
combatants as 
civilian individuals 
and the provision of 
initial assistance for a 
return to civilian life  
Aid to former 
combatants to 
cover their basic 
needs  
Provision of opportunities to 
acquire basic skills in order to 
find work  
Help given  Transfer of former 
combatants and their 
families to 
Demobilisation Centres  
- Provision of food 
and utensils  
- Medical check-up  
- Psychological 
orientation  
- Interviews  
-Identification  
Payment of 
300,000 Le (around 
$150)  
Aid package:  
- Formal education  
- Vocational training  
- Public-sector employment  
-Agriculture  
-Others  
Timescale  1 day  Between 3 and 21 
days  
Basic help for 3 
months  
Between 3 and 9 months, 
according to choice  






Settlement region; Regional 




instruction from NCDDR  
NCDDR  NCDDR  NCDDR  
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During this phase weapons were collected from the different factions. The collection process 
was conducted in 45 reception centers that were established all over the country by the UN 
Peacekeepers. According to Solomon and Ginifer (2008:10) it was conducted in five phases:  
• “The assembly of combatants: receiving, screening, and processing ex-combatants;  
• Collection of personal information: the collection of personal identification and data, 
information, registration, and the verification of weapons or ordnance delivered by the ex-
combatants;  
• Verification, collection and disabling weapons and ammunition prior to their 
destruction;  
• Eligibility certification: Verification and authorisation of the ex-combatants by UN 
observers for their inclusion as beneficiaries in the DDR programme;  
• Transporting screened and disarmed combatants from disarmament sites to 
demobilisation centres.”122  
To avoid frictions, specific zones (reception centers) were designated for each group. Putting 
them in the same centers would have created tension and a potential outbreak of violence. The 
process commenced in Kambia and Port Loko and spread across the country. Fighters from all 
factions in the different parts of the country participated even though some centers received 
more weapons than others.  
In total, “42,330 weapons and more than 1.2 million rounds of ammunition were collected, all 
of which were subsequently destroyed. This number represents a ratio of 0.35 weapons per 
person demobilised and bears no relation to the number of former combatants, meaning that a 
significant number of small arms and light weapons were still in circulation in the country. As 
a result, other disarmament initiatives were introduced in tandem with the DDR programme, 
such as Community Arms Collection and Destruction Program (CACD)”123and “Arms for 
Development both supported by UNDP and implemented by the police Interim Commission 
for the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons124 (now a commission) (ACCD and 
AECID 2006:6). Communities were used as key stakeholders in these initiatives (UNDP, and 
the Police worked with religious, traditional and other community leaders). They were 
                                                          
122
 Also see: http://www.ddr-humansecurity.org.uk/images/DDR%20Case%20Study%20Sierra%20Leone.pdf 
(accessed on the 1st of July 2013)  Also see: 
http://www.escolapau.org/img/programas/desarme/mapa/sierrai.pdf  (accessed on the 3rd of July 2013) 
123






sensitized on the essence of encouraging their communities to bring forward weapons that 
were still in their possession.  
The initiatives led to the collection of 4773 firearms over a period of 8 years that were 
destroyed in Makeni in September 2012.125 
 
Demobilization 
The reintegration phase was divided into two stages: 
• The formal and controlled discharge process where ex-combatants went through 
screening, counselling, profiling, etc. 
• Receiving of discharge papers, identity cards, reinsertion package and transportation to 
communities of origin or choice. 
Cantonment sites were established in accessible areas for the demobilization of ex-
combatants. However, interviewees stated that the sites were in bad conditions and the 
circumstances under which they lived were miserable. Housing, toilet, water, food and 
security provisions were poor. However, this could not be surprising as Sierra Leone was 
coming from a decade of a very brutal conflict with most of the infrastructure available badly 
destroyed. Even in the capital Freetown social amenities and infrastructures were scanty. 
Interviewees also stated that the timeframe for demobilization in some areas was very short 
(ranging between 1 to 2 weeks). Isatu Kallon126 commented that it was not helpful to her as 
she left the site without even getting to understand what she was doing there.  
Jumu Jalloh127 had this to say about the demobilization programme he went through: “I 
expected to have sessions with experts who will tell me what the demobilization process was 
about, have thorough screening done which will include medical screening, with people 
discussing with me my plans for the future. Basically, I was on my own. Some of my 
colleagues were as confused as I were. We noticed that those dealing with us were quite 
urgent to see the programme come to an end than to see us become very comfortable with the 
programme and prepared to enter society once again.” 
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At the end of the demobilization stage 54,000 beneficiaries that voluntarily registered 
received payment of Transitional Safety Allowances (TSA). Children did not go through 
demobilization; they were taken to Interim Care Centers (ICC) developed by the United 
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and other specialized agencies.128 This was due to the 
fact that children are not recognised as fighters and because of their age they need special care 
and should not be mixed with adult combatants.  
The demobilization phase was geared towards breaking the structures of the armed forces and 
also to ensure that the hold that the forces have over their soldiers is completely dissolved. It 
was easier to ensure this with the RUF and AFRC/West Side Boys as most of them went into 
different communities (communities of choice). With the Kamajors it was very challenging as 
they went back into the same communities. 
 
Reintegration 
At the end of the disarmament and demobilization phases the NCDDR had 70,871 ex-
combatants registered for reintegration (Humphrey and Weinstein 2004: 13).  
Table 2: 






Source: Humphrey and Weinstein 2004: 13 
The demobilised soldiers became “eligible to receive reinsertion or resettlement support, 
which included a transport allowance and basic household needs on return to their 
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communities.”129 The support provided saw them through the transition phase into their 




To provide ex-combatants with an alternative source of livelihood several activities were 
designed and implemented. These activities included vocational and technical skills training, 
provision of tools for those interested in agriculture, formal education programmes including 
adult education and accelerated learning programmes (for older children), business skills 
training and quick impact projects (QIPs). Institutions such as the then German Technical 
Cooperation (GTZ) now German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ) supported the 
development of technical and life skills training in different areas. They provided their 
beneficiaries with trainings that should enable them begin and manage their own businesses. 
GTZ had several field and office staff implementing activities related to reintegration. 
(Ginifer 2003: 42). UNDP also played the lead support role to the NCDDR as they provided 
technical and financial support without which the process would not have taken off the 
ground. 
However, activities designed were not based on opportunity mapping and market surveys. 
Thus, the job market was inundated with skills that were not needed. This created a significant 
challenge for ex-combatants as they were unable to compete for decent forms of employment. 
Also, activities designed for women were stereotypical, for instance, most of the trainings 
women and girls went through consisted of gara-tye dying, soap making, basket weaving and 
tailoring.  Furthermore, the service providers had very limited capacity to undertake the skills 
training that they were contracted to undertake. Alongside this, the private sector was not 
fully engaged to ensure that they support the employment drive that ensued after the 
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The social reintegration component of the reintegration phase was geared towards ensuring 
that ex-combatants are accepted or re-accepted into their communities of choice or 
origin.131At the same time, it was also geared towards fostering reconciliation between ex-
combatants and receiving communities. This effort fed into the overall reconciliation process 
in the country. Some of the activities undertaken promoted justice, gender and psycho-social 
related issues (UNOSAA 2005:23). 
To prepare ex-combatants for the potential challenges to be faced in their local communities, 
“ex-combatants were targeted by NCDDR prior to their return. Pre-discharge counselling 
emphasised community orientation, with a special re-entry plan for ex-combatants. This social 
adaptation and development plan was developed jointly by NCDDR and other international 
organisations. Ex-combatants were also brought to ad hoc community reconciliation meetings 
in various parts of the country. In potentially serious cases, where war crimes were alleged, 
NCDDR acted as a facilitator with traditional leaders to facilitate the return of ex-
combatants”132  
To build on the activities undertaken existing social capitals were used such as religious and 
traditional leaders. They were engaged to support the reintegration of ex-combatants. In some 
communities ex-combatants went through traditional cleansing ceremonies to rid them off the 
‘perceived evil that was in them’. Such traditional transitional justice mechanisms were 
supported by the introduction of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone.  
The NCDDR “also encouraged ex-combatants to undertake tasks that were beneficial to 
communities, such as civil works, street cleaning, and helping to rehabilitate shelter. They 
also supported adult education programmes, civic and peace education, music, sports groups, 
and other projects that helped to rebuild social capital.”133  
The social reintegration component of the DDR was implemented with lesser challenges 
faced than initially anticipated as the communities to a large extent willingly re-accepted the 
ex-combatants. Nonetheless, some ex-combatants are still faced with stigmatization and 
stereotypes in certain communities. 
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Financing of the DDR programme 
The disarmament and demobilization phases were mostly financed through the Department of 
Peace Keeping Operations Assessed Budget. This is a fund provided for a mission, normally 
for a period of one year. It covered “personnel costs, equipment for construction of DD sites, 
infrastructure and logistics, operational costs, transportation, rations (food supply), civilian 
clothing and other non-food items, DDR training, information and sensitization activities and 
reinsertion support.”134   
 The reintegration phase was financed with funds from voluntary contributions made by donor 
countries (trust and bi-lateral funds), in-kind contributions by UN agencies, World Bank 
grants and other assistance received by the government of Sierra Leone. 
The support from the Multi-Donor Trust Fund through the World Bank was $ 36.5 million135 
as could be seen in the table below. 
 
Table 3: 
Multi-Donor Trust Fund Donor  Estimated value (millions of 
dollars)  
Canada  1.9 
Denmark  0.4 
EU  9.0 
Germany  6.8 
Italy  0.4 
Japan  2.3 
Netherlands  7.5 
Norway  1.5 
Sweden  0.7 
Switzerland  1.5 
United Kingdom  2.4 
USA  1.9 
TOTAL  36.5  
Source: Catalonia School for a Culture of Peace 2006:4 
Other key contributors included Japan that provided $3 million in 2002 (ACCD and AECID 
2006:4) 
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Challenges faced during the implementation of DDR 
According to a 2005 conference report by the Government of Sierra Leone and UNOSAA the 
programme faced the following challenges: “a. misunderstanding of the eligibility criteria, b. 
prolonged period of encampment c. limited access to parts of the country to start reintegration 
activities d. limited availability of credible and capable implementing partners e. inadequate 
support to dependents of ex-combatants and women associated with fighting forces f. the 
weak programme link between DDR and RRR.”136 
Another major challenge that gravely affected the programme was the implementation of a 
twin track transitional justice mechanisms “The Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission”137 parallel to the demobilization and reintegration phases. 
They created a sense of fear on the part of the ex-combatants who thought that they were 
going to be prosecuted for war crimes. Several NGO and CBOs were contracted to conduct 
sensitization programmes geared towards educating the ex-combatants about the TRC and 
SCSL and to further get them understand that that only key leaders were going to be tried by 
the SCSL.  
The Post-Conflict Reintegration Initiatives for Development and Empowerment (PRIDE), an 
NGO, played a leading role during this period. One of its founders (Lawrence Santigie Sesay) 
had this to say when interviewed138 “The SCSL was started at the wrong moment, the 
government and the international community should have waited until the reintegration 
component had commenced. The combatants refused to go through the programme until they 
were convinced that they were not going to be tried. We went through all the districts of 
Sierra Leone to have discussions with them and allay their fears and doubts.” 
Despite this, several combatants refused to go through the programme and they either moved 
to Liberia or auto-demobilized.139 Also, the country was faced with massive destruction and 
social amenities were either bad or non-functional. Communities lacked the capacity to absorb 
the returning ex-combatants and there was a high sense of fear and distrust for ex-combatants 
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 RRR means Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction. The RRR programme was geared towards 
assisting IDPs, refugees return and resettle in their communities. It was also geared towards helping to rebuild 
local communities and provide them with the basic facilities that enabled people to live in decency and dignity. 
It complemented the efforts of the DDR programme as it implemented activities that fostered reconciliation 
and stimulated local economies. 
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See:  http://www.ictj.net/downloads/Handbook.pdf (accesseed on the 10th of July 2013) 
138
 Telephone interview conducted on the 6
th
 of April 2013. 
139
 Auto-demobilization is the process of self-demobilizing. Combatants who do not want to go through a DDR  
programme personally take care of their reintegration process. They get reintegrated into a community of 
origin or choice without any help from the DDR programme. 
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within the local communities. Coupled with this, the economy of the country was in a bad 




























4. Research Methodology         
4.1 Research Question 
A careful examination of the background above led to the research being centred on three 
main issues (1) the current socio-economic conditions of ex-combatants (2) the differences 
and similarities between pre-war, war and current statuses (3) how effective was the DDR 
programme in ensuring the full-socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants. 
Based on this the research question was derived and it could be seen below:  
How effective is the socio-economic reintegration process of ex-combatants in Sierra Leone? 
Sub questions 
The under mentioned are the sub questions of the research: 
1) What are the current socio-economic conditions of ex-combatants? 
2) What types of socio-economic activities are ex-combatants involved in? Is their 
present status better than before the war? 
3) What are some of the challenges faced by ex-combatants in their reintegration 
process?  
4) In what ways can the reintegration process be enhanced to discourage the re-
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4.3 Operationalization of Major Concepts 
 
Combatant: For the purpose of this study a combatant is a person who played an active or 
passive role in the different fighting forces during the conflict in Sierra Leone. These roles 
include combat roles, serving as a cook, spy, bush wife, sex-slave, load carrier etc. 
Ex-Combatant: A person “who has assumed any of the responsibilities or carried out any of 
the activities mentioned in the definition of ‘combatant’, and has laid down or surrendered 
his/her arms with a view to entering a DDR process. Former combatant status may be 
certified through a demobilization process by a recognized authority. Spontaneously auto-
demobilized individuals such as deserters may also be considered ex-combatants if proof of 
non-combatant status over a period of time can be given.”140  
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: A process that 
contributes to security and stability by taking weapons from the hands of combatants, taking 
the combatants out of military structures and helping them to integrate socially and 
economically into society by finding civilian livelihoods.141 
Reintegration: The process by which ex-combatants “acquire civilian status and gain 
sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic 
process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is 
part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often 
necessitates long-term external assistance.”142 
Social Reintegration: The process through which ex-combatants are re-accepted into their 
communities and feel that they are part of the community. The objective of social 
reintegration is to facilitate the transformation of demobilized soldiers from military service to 
productive members of their respective communities. The social reintegration assistance 
should promote reconciliation and make contributions to continued social cohesion in the 
communities of settlement and in the society at large. The main activities can comprise of 
“pre-discharge orientation, information and sensitization of the target groups, implementing 
partners, home communities, the public at large support and enhancement of143 referral 
                                                          
140




 Secretary General of the United Nations note to the General Assembly, A/C.5/59/31, May 2005. 
143
 See: http://unddr.org/docs/project%20document%20Puntland%20DDR%20-%20nov%2003.pdf (accessed on 
the 1st of July 2013) 
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services at different levels, strengthening of relevant specialized services” (Sudan National 
Reintegration Strategy 2007: 12).  
Economic Reintegration: “The process through which the ex-combatants households build 
up their livelihood through production and other types of gainful employment. Reintegration 
programmes assist with the provision of viable economic and durable livelihood reintegration 
support that ensures the long-term economic viability of reintegration for ex-combatants such 
as vocational training, education, business development advice, on the job, basic 
entrepreneurship, adult literacy and numeracy trainings”144 (Sudan National Reintegration 
Strategy 2007: 12).    
Reintegration Programme: The assistance ex-combatants receive to make their transition 
from combatants to civilians successful. 
Reintegration Process: Is the transition process ex-combatants go through with or without 
assistance. It starts at the end of the reintegration programme and continues for several years. 
The post-war recovery process positively affects or promotes the reintegration process of ex-
combatants. If the economy is not transformed to enable it create employment possibilities 
and reduce the level of poverty, ex-combatants will find their reintegration process to be very 
challenging. 
Livelihood: “The capabilities, assets (including both material ad social assets) and activities 
required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover 
from stress and shocks, and maintain or improve its capabilities and assets, while not 
undermining the natural resource base.”145 In this study, “livelihood is about the alternative (if 
any) sources of employment available to ex-combatants and their ability to access the means 







                                                          
144
 See: http://www.bicc.de/general/events/devcon/kingma.html (accessed on the 1st of July 2013) 
145







 The study was rooted on the philosophical foundation of subjectivism. Subjectivism claims 
that no objective reality exists and that there are many ambiguous realities and that the 
researcher is not neutral or independent of the researched (Summer, A. and Tribe, M. 
2008:59-63). The theoretical perspective is interpretivism which enabled me have an 
interactive and open-minded study and further acquire a good knowledge of the subjects 
researched. The methodology of this study was a multi-method approach of small scale 
ethnographic research and questionnaires. The main method employed was semi-structured 
interviews and structured questionnaires. Pie charts were created out of the questionnaires 
administered to ensure easy understanding of the findings. Also, the stories of some of the 
interviewees are presented as they were stated by them; this positively drew out the findings 
from the ethnographic approach. The field work brought me very close to the researched and I 
was able to better understand the challenges they face on a daily basis.  
Reflection – researcher’s own reality 
I worked on the reintegration of ex-combatants for over 6 years (2000-2006) as the Public 
Relations/Child Protection Officer of the Post Conflict Reintegration Initiatives for 
Development and Empowerment (PRIDE). During this period I met with ex-combatants in all 
the districts of Sierra Leone and I listened to their fears, their doubts and at the same time 
their hopes, wishes and aspirations. I had hope in the promise of a better tomorrow for them. 
We encouraged them to give up their weapons and give peace a chance and at the same time 
promised them a better and decent future.  
After the DDR, my thoughts were stringed on the possibilities that the post-war reconstruction 
efforts would create the space for the former combatants to move away from the poverty and 
destitution in which they were trapped. Six years after my interaction with them I decided to 
go out in the field again and assess their transformation process. Thus, I based my PHD 
research on them. I was interested in seeing the different turn their lives would have taken as 
the country continues to build on the fragile peace that exists. I became deeply touched by the 
stories I heard from the first set of former combatants in Freetown and the similarity in the 
stories became stronger as I travelled across the country.  Some of these stories are presented 
in the findings section of this thesis. Despite the stories told, I was struck by the patience, the 
quietness and the inner struggles of the ex-combatants. I was mostly listening to what they 
were not saying; I looked into their eyes and could hear more words than they were saying to 
me. I compared the conversations I had with some of them 6 years ago to the ones we were 
having during the interviews. Nonetheless, I presented their words as they said it for the 
readers to have a clear understanding of what they are going through.  
63 
 
4.5 Location of the Research  
The research was conducted in the 14 districts of Sierra Leone: In the Western Area: 
Freetown Rural and Freetown Urban, In the Southern region: Bo, Bonthe, Moyamba and 
Pujehun. In the Eastern region: Kenema, Kono, Kailahun. In the North: Bombali, Port Loko, 
Kambia, Koinadugu and Tonkolili. The study took a national twist as it became necessary to 
have an idea of the challenges faced in all the different areas of the country. While this may 
not give a definite conclusion on the status of all ex-combatants it presents the realities of 
some ex-combatants in all the 14 districts of the country.   
Areas in the different districts visited are:  
Table 4: 
District Locations visited 
Freetown Urban Kingtom, Brookfields, Guard Street, 
Mountain Cut, Government Wharf, Kissy, 
Calaba Town. Government agencies and 
other institutions were visited during field 
consultations. 
Freetown Rural Goderich, Waterloo, Newton, Lakka and 
Tombo 
Bo  Baoma, Badjia, Gbo, Kakua, Lugbu and 
Selenga 
Bonthe Bum, Jong, Imperri and Sogbini 
Moyamba  Kaiyamba, Fori, Dasse and Kagboro  
Pujehun Kpanga Kagonde, Gallines Perri and 
Makpele 
Kailahun Njalauhun, Kissi Tongi, Kissi Teng, Dea, 
Yawei and Penguia 
Kono Lei, Gbense and Tankoro 
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Kenema Nongowa, Tunkia, Niawa Lenga, Wando and 
Langurama   
Bombali Biriwa Tambakka, Sanda Loko and Paki 
Masabong 
Kambia Mambolo, Samu and Tonko Limba 
Port Loko Maforki and Loko Massama 
Koinadugu Neya, Diang, Nieni, Sulima and Mongo 
Tonkolili Kalansongoia, Gbonkolenken and Tane 
 
The locations were carefully selected based on discussions the researcher had with 
stakeholders that worked on reintegration related issues or that currently work on issues 
related to national development. In their work, they meet ex-combatants and thus have good 
knowledge of where they could be found. They provided valuable information on the best 
locations to be visited. Also, the areas gravely affected by the war and communities that faced 
severe challenges when ex-combatants returned were visited. Coupled with this, ex-
combatants interviewed provided information on communities to be interviewed. The 
‘snowballing’ method took effect in every district and several ex-combatants that were 
interviewed were met through their former colleagues. 
 
4.6 Unit of Analysis  
 
The target population consisted of government agencies, ex-combatants, local community 
members, representatives of international NGOs, members of local NGOs and members of 
community based organisations.  
A total of 140 ex-combatants were interviewed in the 14 districts147 of Sierra Leone (10 per 
district), 140 community members were interviewed (10 per district). 30 inter-governmental 
agencies (United Nations, ECOWAS and Mano River Organisations), government agencies 
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 The districts are Freetown Rural, Freetown Urban, Bo, Bonthe, Moyamba, Pujehun, Kenema, Kono, Kailahun, 
Bombali, Port Loko, Kambia, Koinadugu, Tonkolili. 
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(line ministries and commissions); INGOs and NGOs were interviewed in Freetown, Bo, 
Kenema and Makeni. The agencies and organisations targeted are organisations that provided 
services to ex-combatants during the DDR programme phase and they continue to work on 
development related issues in local communities across the country.  
The entire country was targeted so as to have a good understanding of the differences and 
similarities faced by ex-combatants. The community members were also targeted as families 
and community member have a key role to play in the reintegration process of ex-combatants. 
This was important as they provided information on the social coping mechanisms and 
networks existing in their communities, relationship with ex-combatants, challenges faced by 
ex-combatants, issues related to stereotypes etc.  
Government agencies were targeted to assess the support they continued to provide to ex-
combatants and local communities after the end of the reintegration programme. They were 
also targeted to enable the study assess what they could have done to further assist the ex-
combatants in their transition after the DDR programme.  
Specific INGOs were targeted as they were involved in the reintegration programme and they 
still provide services to local communities where ex-combatants were reintegrated into. The 
services they provide currently are not reintegration related but the study wanted to assess 
how the services trickle down to the ex-combatants and indirectly assist their reintegration 













5. Findings  
This chapter presents the findings on the social status of former combatants. The findings are 
divided into the status of male and female combatants to provide a clear understanding of how 
they are going through their different reintegration processes. Chapter 5 is divided into the 
current social status and chapter 6 into the current economic status of former combatants. The 
graph below indicates the percentage of male and female combatants interviewed.  
 Table 5: 
 
In all the communities visited male and female ex-combatants were interviewed and they also 
partook in focus group discussions. A good balance of male and female interviewees was 
ensured to make sure that the differences in experiences faced by the two sexes are captured 
in the study.  
A significant percentage of the interviewees have a very low level of education as indicated in 
the graph below. 66% of the interviewees have never attended formal school, 16 % attained 
primary education, 12% secondary education with 6% having attained higher education.  
While those with primary education attained them before the war, all of those with higher 
education stated that they acquired them after the war. The two common institutions that 
interviewees with higher education stated they attended were Fourah Bay College (FBC) and 
Milton Margai College of Science and Technology (MMCET). Peace and Conflict Studies 
(FBC and MMCET), Social Work and Business Studies (MMCET) are among the three 
















There is a huge disparity in the educational level between former male and female 
combatants. For instance, female combatants constitute only 1% of the 6% with higher 
education. Of the 16% with secondary education women only constitute 2%. During 
interviews and focus group discussions denial of access to education, early marriage and 
poverty were stated to be the key reasons for the high rate of illiteracy among girls before the 
war.  
The DDR programme in Sierra Leone made provision for skills training for former 
combatants as part of their socio-economic reintegration assistance. This was geared towards 
enabling them access alternative sources of livelihood that will help the live in decency and 
dignity. 80% of the interviewees indicated that they partook of such trainings with 20% 













It was realised during the interviews that those who did not go through the training either 
auto-demobilized or did not fit the set eligibility criteria especially women, family members 
and those who played support roles.  
Interviewees were sourced from all factions that partook in the conflict as could be seen in the 
graph below. While the number of former female combatants interviewed from the other 
factions was very limited, the number from the RUF was quite high with over 60% of the 
interviewees being females. It was also easier to reach former members of the CDF than 
former members of the RUF and AFRC/West Side Boys. This was mostly due to the fact that 
the Kamajors hailed from the same local communities, social structures and networks. Also, 
they are regarded in their communities as heroes unlike the other factions that were regarded 



















Combatants were recruited during the entire course of the conflict and at the same time some 
factions became part of the conflict at different points of the conflict. For instance, the 
AFRC/West Side became involved in the conflict after the 25th of May 1997 coup d’états. 
Thus, combatants became recruited at different points in time, some at the start, some in the 
mid-point and some at the tail end of the conflict. 67% of the interviewees were combatants 
for periods ranging from 1 to 3 years, while 22% stayed between 3 and 5 years and 11% 
remained combatants between 5 and 10 years. No combatant was reached that stayed the full 














The different factions used two major forms of recruitment, voluntary or forced recruitment 
(abduction). 74% of the interviewees stated that they were forcefully recruited while 26% 
stated that they volunteered. Most of those who volunteered were part of the CDF while the 








Reasons stated for volunteering into the fighting forces included poverty, culture of war, 
revenge, protection of self, family and community, political ideology, illiteracy and 
unemployment. Unemployment and poverty ranked as the two leading motivational factors 
for volunteering. 
Interviewees were involved in different roles in their various factions. As illustrated in the 
graph below, 65% of all the interviewees were fighters with most of them being middle level 
















Some of the spies, bush wives and load carriers auto-demobilized as some reported being 
marginalized during DDR or did not want to be identified as combatants. Nonetheless, 80% of 
the interviewees (as indicated below) stated that they went through DDR with 20% stating 
that they did not go through it for the above stated reasons. 
Table 12:  
 
Apart from those who auto-demobilized due to marginalization related reasons there were 
some that auto-demobilized because of fear and lack of understanding as to what the DDR 
process entailed. The introduction of the Special Court for Sierra Leone was cited as one of 
the key reasons that led to some ex-combatants auto-demobilizing themselves. They were 
afraid that they were going to be arrested and prosecuted while going through DDR. Also, 
some ex-combatants were not aware of the fact that there was the option of them moving to 
communities of their choices. They believed that DDR was going to take them back into their 
communities of origin. Most of them had committed atrocities in their communities (the RUF 
forced recruits to commit atrocities in their communities to discourage them from running 
away from the force) and wanted to move as far away from them as possible.  
 
5.1.1 Current social status of former male combatants 
  
The reintegration programme implemented several activities that were geared towards 
assisting the former combatants peacefully co-habit with community members in their 
communities of origin or choice. Some of the activities implemented were also geared 
towards improving their social status. Parallel to projects for ex-combatants, community 
members were targeted to ensure that they accept or re-accept the former combatants into 
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their settings. Several key questions were asked in interviews and focus group discussions 
with the answers provided presented in this section. 
It was observed that almost half of the interviewees (49% as could be seen in the graph 










A significant percentage of those that did not return to their communities of origin stated that 
they had committed unforgivable atrocities there and were scared to face their relatives. This 
was mostly the case of RUF and AFRC/West Side Boys. One of the interviewees148 described 
what he did in his community: “I killed my mother and sister, set my uncle on fire and had his 
daughter sing and dance while he was crying for help. I know she will never forgive me and I 
do not want to ever look her straight in the eyes again as I will go crazy. Memories of my past 
acts haunt me every day.”  
Unlike the RUF, almost all the former CDF members interviewed are living in their 
communities of origin. This is due to the fact that they were looked at as heroes and were 
readily welcomed back in their communities. In certain cases they (some Kamajors) never 
actually left their communities as they formed protection units that secured their people.  
The graph below illustrates that 62% of the former male combatants interviewed stated that 
they are not recognised as former combatants in their communities, while 27% stated that they 
are recognised as former combatants and 11% do not know if they are recognised as such.  
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Those who are not recognised as former combatants are those who did not return to their 
communities of origin. Santigie Kalokoh149 in Kambia expressed his frustration: “You will 
never know that people still look at you as a former combatant until something happens. 
Recently I had a quarrel with a lady and she was quick to tell me that I should not have been 
reaccepted into the community as I have done scary things and might hurt people again if I 
continue staying there. I felt sad and unhappy as even those who did not know that I was part 
of the RUF now know.” 
13% of the male interviewees indicated that they face discrimination and stereotyping in their 
communities. Two of the interviewees who assist their friends with their motorcycle and taxi 
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Ishmael Sankoh150 formerly of the West Side Boys stated that he has tried to secure a loan to 
begin his motorcycle taxi business but those he meet always refer to his past life as a reason 
they will not deal with him. He feels that the reconciliation and forgiveness that was preached 
during the DDR has not sunk into some people.  
The graph below indicates that 52% of the former male combatants are part of social networks 
in their communities while 48% are not. Some of the networks that former combatants are 
part of are youth clubs, community based organisations and religious groups. Common 
reasons among the former male combatants for not being part of social networks within their 
communities include not being interested, feeling insecure and becoming withdrawn from 
society. Unlike former CDF members these factors are very common among former RUF and 
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86% of the former male combatants stated that the communities in which they live make no 
effort in encouraging them to involve in social activities.151 In as much as the status of most of 
those (ex-combatants) that are not within their communities of origin are not known, the 
former combatants stated that the status of those who are origins of those communities are 




Community encourages former combatants 
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 Note that while 52% of the ex-combatants indicated that they are part of social networks, the graph above 
is indicating that only 14% feel that their communities are encouraging their involvement into social networks. 
This does not mean that they are discouraged; the 52% reflects the efforts of some ex-combatants to be part of 
social networks.  
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However, Patrick Songa152 a former CDF middle level commander stated that he is aware that 
“in places like Kailahun, Pujehun and Moyamba the communities for a couple of years after 
the war made conscious efforts to make ex-combatants feel as part of their society´. This he 
said has changed “as people no longer focus on the war but on moving forward as a nation.” 
14% of the interviewees stated that they are involved in leadership roles. These roles include 
being youth, community and religious leaders. 12 out of the 14% of these leaders are in the 
South-Eastern parts of Sierra Leone and are former CDF members.  It became obvious that 
former CDF commanders are highly revered in their communities. Moijue Kallon153 a resident 
of Pujehun commented: “the former Kamajors still respect their former commanders much 
more than they respect local authorities. When we have an issue with them we go to their 








5.1.2 Current social status of former female combatants 
 
This section specifically draws out the social status of former female combatants as they go 
through their reintegration process. Unlike the former male combatants there are more former 
female combatants (interviewees) who stay within their communities of origin. The graph 
below indicates the percentage to be 65% while 35% moved to communities of choice. 
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 Interview conducted on the 15th of March 2013 in Moyamba. 
153
 Interview conducted on the 20th of March 2013 in Pujehun. 
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Similar to the male interviewees, reasons provided for not returning to communities of origin 
included fear of revenge for crimes committed and fear of stereotypes and marginalization. 
Some of the reasons provided for returning to communities of origin included need for social 
support from family, desire to reconcile with family and having no other place to go to. Neneh 
Kallay154 expressed her reasons as follows: “In spite of the fear the only place I thought of 
returning to was my village. I knew I could not hide or run from my people forever, so I made 
up my mind to go and face the shame and disgrace of my past actions. Surprisingly, they 








52% of the former female combatants stated that they are not recognised as former 
combatants while 30% stated that they are recognised as former combatants and 18% stated 
that they do not know if they are recognised as such. However, a great number of those who 
stated that they are recognised as former combatants indicated that they are reminded of their 
past mostly in unpleasant ways especially when something goes wrong in their communities. 
Ami Sankoh155 in Kambia recounted her very recent experience: “I wanted to secure a piece 
of land for agriculture and I made my desire known to the elders in my community. However, 
I did not know that there was another community member with similar interest for the same 
piece of land. She mobilized community people against me (asking the elders not to give me 
the piece of land) saying that I am a former combatant and also not married.”  
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 Interview conducted on the 3rd of February 2013 in Bo. 
155
 Interview conducted on the 15th of February 2013 in Kambia. 
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Aisha Kallon156 of Pujehun stated that she still sees people pointing at her when she passes in 
her town and overhears them talking about her involvement with the RUF. She stated that this 
has serious psycho-social effects on her as she is constantly reminded of her past, despite the 










As illustrated in the graph below, 36% of the interviewees stated that they face discrimination 
in their homes and in some cases domestic violence. Some of the violence they face includes 
physical and psychological abuse. This they stated puts them under serious stress, pressure 
and tension and they are never happy. Some reported that they are still seen as bad influence 
to other members of their family. These members are normally warned not to get close to 
them. Rugiatu Bangura157 is a victim of such marginalization and domestic violence. She 
cried while explaining her ordeal: “My house is like hell. My relatives treat me like a 
stranger. I am the first to get up and the last to go to bed I do all the household chores but yet 
still I cannot drink from the cups they drink or eat from the plate they eat from. They call me 
names and the children are not allowed to come close to me as they say I have blood on my 
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 Interview conducted on the 21st of March 2013 in Pujehun. 
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Fatmata Sesay158, formerly with the AFRC/West Side Boys, stated that her family has never 
fully reaccepted her after she left the faction. She said “I was denied access to every bedroom 
in the house and have to sleep in the living room with my child. They constantly remind me 
that my child has no father and was born in the bush. My child is not allowed to play with the 
other children in the house. I have lived like this for the past 10 years, I cannot afford to leave 
because I have no job that will enable me rent a room.” 
Like other former combatants, Fatmata is caught in the pool of poverty and has no control 
over what she wants to do or not do. She cannot fend for herself or her child as she lacks 
access to the means of production. At the same time she is not eductaed or trained so she 
cannot seek or secure any source of employment. Thus, leaving her family’s house is not an 
option as she has no other means of survival.  
There is a huge disparity in terms of male and female ex-combatants involved in social 
networks. While 52% of former male combatants are part of social networks, only half of that 
percentage of female interviewees are involved in social networks as could be seen in the 
graph below.  
 
 
                                                          
158










26% of the female interviewees play roles in youth and community based networks. However, 
most of the female interviewees stated that the networks they are involved in are not aware of 
their past. The few whose identities are known indicated that they are fully integrated into 
their networks. Reasons such as fear of rejection, lack of self-confidence, fear of being 
recognised and lack of the desire to be part of networks were among the key reasons for non-
involvement in social networks by some of the female interviewees.   
18% of the female interviewees stated that the communities in which they reside encourage 
them to be part of social activities. This percentage is very low when compared to the 82% 
who stated that their communities do not encourage former female combatants to be part of 
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A crucial issue looked into that has great impact on the social reintegration process of former 
combatants is the access they have to social amenities and institutions. These social 
institutions include health, educational institutions and recreational facilities. 43% of the 
female interviewees stated that they have no access to social amenities and institutions while 
57% stated that they have access. Nonetheless, the access is said to be very limited and in 
most cases interviewees could not afford to pay for services delivered by health and 
educational institutions. This is especially the case in local communities in the interior of the 
country. A key social facility lacking in most communities especially among young 
interviewees is that of recreational facilities and youth centers. Hawa Sillah in Magburaka159 
stated: “We have no recreational facilities and this does not help us to overcome the stress 
and frustrations we face. Also, we have always been in need of psycho-social counseling 
centers that will help us cope with our past but they are just not available. This makes our 
lives very difficult and in most cases unbearable.” 
The statement of Hawa reflects the reality of many communities even within Freetown. 10 
years after the war, Sierra Leone still has only one trained and qualified psychiatrist, Dr. 
Nahim.160 Also, the psycho-social component of the DDR programme was said to be very 
weak and ineffective.161 Much has not changed despite all the reforms that have taken place. 
This is slightly different in the case of the educational sector which through the SABABU162 
education project built several schools even though the very basics in terms of uniforms and 
books are expensive for the parents to secure-school fees are free at the basic education level. 
Recently, a free health care service system was initiated by the government for pregnant 
women and lactating mothers (former female fighters are also benefiting from it). However, 
these facilities lack trained and qualified personnel and also the required drugs are not 
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 Interview conducted on the 10th of April 2013 in Magburaka. 
160
 It is rumoured that he retired in July 2013. If this is the case then the country is left with no trained and 
qualified psychiatrist. 
161
 Interview conducted with Joe Patrick Amara on the 24
th
 of December 2012 in Freetown. Can you indicate his 
expertise on the matter?  
162
 The SABABU Education project was introduced at the end of the project to help rebuild the education 










In looking at leadership roles that the female interviewees play, only 5% stated as indicated in 
the graph below that they play leadership roles in their communities. The roles they play are 
mostly within youth organisations and religious groups. 95% of the female interviewees stated 








Interviews with other women (who are not former combatants) in local communities led to the 
confirmation that the limited leadership roles played by women is not limited to former 
female combatants. The patriarchal structures of local communities have entrenched the 
position of women taking the back seat. As Amie Tholley of the UNICEF office in Makeni 
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stated, “many men believe that women should be seen and not heard when it comes to 
decision-making processes in local communities.”163  
63% of the interviewees stated that they would like to be involved in decision-making 
processes but they feel that trying to push their way through will turn attention to them. Also, 
a significant percentage of the interviewees stated that the poverty and economic hardship 
they face leave them with little confidence or willingness to get involved in leadership or 
decision making processes. Yatta Kallon164 sadly concluded with these words: “Surviving is a 
challenge; I just want to live and not make my life any complex by taking on issues that will 
only create tension and hatred for me in my community. I am sick and tired of fighting or 
struggling for the very basic rights I should enjoy in life.” 
The feeling expressed by Yata Kallon which is based on her current context was expressed by 
several interviewees as one of the reasons why they took up arms. While Yatta has resigned to 
fate, other interviewees have not and they crave for the change that will enable them feel as 




         
The DDR programme had many initiatives that were bent on fostering the social reintegration 
of former combatants thereby enabling them peacefully co-habit with community members, 
with community members fully re-accepting them. While there may be said to have been very 
few cases of tension between former combatants and community members, it became evident 
during field consultations that the social reintegration process of former combatants is still 
faced with several challenges.  These challenges include stereotypes, marginalization, lack of 
access to social amenities and institutions, fear of being recognised (those in communities of 
choice), no access to psycho-social support, domestic/gender-based violence and lack of 
access to land. The challenges faced have seriously affected the transformation process of ex-
combatants as they are constantly reminded of their recent past. This constant reminder and 
inability to move away from the past heightens the stress and trauma levels among the former 
combatants.  
                                                          
163
 Interview conducted on the 27th of December 2012 in Freetown.  
164
 Interview conducted on the 3rd of January 2013 in Kailahun, Eastern Sierra Leone.  
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It became evident during the research that there are much more female combatants living in 
their communities of origin than former male combatants. From observation and interviews 
(in communities visited) it was concluded that more female than male ex-combatants went 
back to their communities of origin. The main reasons for this include: need for social support 
from family, desire to reconcile with family and having no other place to go to.  
The social reintegration process of former CDF combatants is faced with lesser challenges 
that the process undergone by former RUF/West Side Boys. This is due to the fact that the 
CDF was and still is looked at as a patriotic force that fought in the interest of the people of 
Sierra Leone while the RUF was looked at as unpatriotic perpetrators of violence targeted 
against innocent people.  
Most of the former CDF combatants are recognised in their communities and looked at as 
heroes. Former RUF/West Side Boys interviewees recognised in their communities have 
faced castigations and stereotyping. This is mostly the case in smaller societies than in larger 
ones. In places such as Kailahun, the Fambul Tok project led by John Caulker continues to 
reconcile ex-combatants with community members. It takes a similar reconciliation pattern 
like that of the TRC but at family and community levels. There are organisations that provide 
support to communities especially in crucial areas such as Kailahun. These organisations 
include MARWOPNET, WANEP and Conciliation Resources. However, the number of 
activities is very limited and the resources available to implement them are also inadequate.  
Thus, the gains made by the DDR initiatives have been lost in the years after the programme.  
Some female combatants are still faced with discrimination, marginalization and in some 
cases domestic violence in their homes and communities. However, it should be noted that 
other women in communities visited stated that they are also faced with discrimination and 
marginalization. The challenge that former female combatants spoke frequently about during 
interviews is the lack of access to land in some parts of the country especially the north.  
There are more male interviewees involved in social networks and leadership positions than 
female interviewees. Female interviewees feel less empowered, less capacitated and less 
confident to be involved in social networks or become involved in leadership or decision-
making roles. Coupled with this, stereotypes and stigmatizations form principal reasons why 




5.2. Current economic status of former combatants 
 
The reintegration programme provided the former combatants with skills training, educational 
support (this support also included Accelerated Learning Programmes, ALP165) especially for 
former Children Associated with Armed Forces and Groups (CAAFAGs), agricultural 
equipments, involvement in quick impact projects etc. QIPs are  short term programmes that 
were geared towards not only stimulating local economies but also to readily put cash in their 
pockets and food in their houses. They included the rehabilitation or (re)construction of public 
facilities tht were of immense significance to local communities. These include roads, 
markets, farms, wells, and public toilets. QIPs also served as a reconciliation mechanism as 
they brought together former combatants and community members, thereby causing them to 
work together for the first time. This section presents the findings on the economic 
reintegration process, it examines the ex-ccombatants‘ current economic status and compares 
their current and pre-was statuses.  
 5.2.1 Former Male Combatants 
 
This section specifically presents the findings on former male combatants. The graph below 
presents the skills trainings provided to former male combatants during the reintegration 
phase of DDR166. The graph indicates that 33% of all male interviewees undertook computing 
training, 23% undertook agriculture related trainings, 14% entrepreneurship, 11% mechanic, 
9% arts and crafts, 6% carpentry and 4% stated other forms of training which included mason 
and bricklaying. However, 65% of the male interviewees stated that the time provided for 
training which ranged from 3 to 6 months was not sufficient for them to master the arts in 
which they were trained. This left them with insufficient skills to either seek employment in 
the stated skills or to start up their own businesses.  
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 ALP is a catch-up mechanism for older children who would like to return to school. The key objective of ALP 
is to assist children to be able to be in the same class with their age mates instead of staying in classes where 
they have children they are by far older than. Thus, they are provided with specialists in child education and 
special programmes and calendars that foster their education. 
166
 It should be noted that all the ex-combatants who went through the DDR were provided with skills training 
and the kind of training provided to an ex-combatant was determined during the profiling stage (which takes 
place during demobilization and at the beginning of the reintegration process). Ex-combatants indicated during 
profiling the kind of economic activity that they would like to get involved in and the profiler discusses the 





















82% of the male interviewees stated that they are unemployed (as indicated in the graph 
below) and have been seeking but could not secure employment since the end of the DDR 
programme. Some indicated that they have resorted to cleaning up restaurants and washing 
dishes so they could secure a plate of food or some money for cigarettes. Saidu Marah167 in 
Koinadugu expressed his frustration: “We thought things could get better after the DDR 
training but they only got worse. Now I live a very miserable life and I cannot take care of 
myself or my child. I have to wash up the clothes and dishes of people so I can have food for 
us to eat. I was trained to use a computer but never touched one until the programme ended. 
We were using a card board for demonstrations as we only had one computer in the school. 
Now I cannot find a job and this is killing me.”  
Other interviewees including staff of organisations that provided services to ex-combatants 
during the reintegration phase confirmed the story of Saidu. They stated that the grave 
challenge faced was the weak capacity of the service providers. The service providers did not 
have the required equipment or skills needed to train former combatants. Thus, the former 
combatants left the training schools more confused on the way forward than when they 
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The 18% employed are mostly those who sought employment in agriculture and arts and 
crafts (which were skills acquired during DDR and they constitute the 29% indicated in the 
graph below. To be clearer, the 29% are actually the ex-combatants who gained employment 
due to the skills they gained from the DDR trainings) and those with such skills are in the 
northern and eastern regions of the country. Agriculture is the biggest employer in Sierra 
Leone as it provides over 70% of employment opportunities (Restless Development 2012: 3). 
There was no interviewee who acquired computing skills that secured a job in computing as 
the case was for those who partook in mechanic and mason trainings. However, a few are 











Several reasons were proffered for the unemployment that the former combatants are faced 
with. These reasons as illustrated in the graph below include lack of access to employment 
(29%), lack of skills required to seek and secure employment (20%), lack of access to 
information on employment opportunities (20%), unavailability of jobs (14%) and 
marginalization (17%).  Moijue Kallon168 a former Kamajor now living in Freetown stated 
that it is almost like there is a deliberate attempt to ward them off employment opportunities. 
“We cannot find any information on employment, in fact we do not know how to find them, 
when you find information, they say they need work experience, where can one get the 
experience when one has never been employed. My brother, this is like having a bad dream 
that one cannot wake up from.” 
Similar frustrations were expressed by Patrick Aruna169 formerly of the West Side Boys: 
“Jobs are just not available. Sometimes our past also does not help. When the potential 
employer realizes that you are a former combatant they stop talking to you. My past cannot be 
hidden as people in my community know who I am.”  
The lack of access to employment opportunities widens the cycle of poverty into which the 
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In as much as the study focuses on former combatants it should be noted that complaints 
related to unemployment are not limited to them. Other young and not so young people 
complained during interviews of unemployment and how it affects their lives. Their situation 
is quite similar to those of former combatants. The difference is the stigmatization and 
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 Interview conducted on the 5th of January 2013 in Freetown.  
169
 Interview conducted on the 6th of January 2013 in Freetown. 
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marginalization faced by the former combatants. Young graduates could not hide their sense 
of frustration and among them John Momoh170 a very eloquent young graduate from Fourah 
Bay College had this to say: “I had high hopes of accessing a job and living a happy life 
when I left FBC. My hopes were dashed away after one year of applying for a job and getting 
no positive response. 6 years after I left FBC the only job I have had was to manage a store 
for 6 months. I am a very unhappy and traumatized man and this sense of unhappiness 
augments every day as my situation becomes desperate.”  
As the lack of required skills was proffered as a reason for unemployment, it was observed 
that only 23% of the interviewees had undergone extra trainings after the DDR programme. 
77% stated that they had not undergone any form of training and this has not helped their 
quest for a sustainable source of livelihood. These trainings were provided by INGOs and 
NGOs such as the Mano River Women’s Peacebuilding Network (MARWOPNET), West 
Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), BRAC Microfinance Sierra Leone and Finance 
Salone with a focus on peacebuilding, agriculture and entrepreneurship.  
Table 30: 
 
32% of the male interviewees stated that they have received financial and material support 
after DDR. The support is mostly in the form of seeds, tools and cash to work on agriculture. 
68% stated that they have not received any form of support after DDR. All of the interviewees 
who have received support are resident in the interior of the country. Interviewees in major 
cities and Freetown have not received any form of support. This is due to the fact that the 
focus of (I)NGOs is on local communities than on bigger cities.  
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44% of interviewees who have received financial and material support stated that they 
received the support from inter-governmental agencies especially World Food Programme 
(WFP) through their ´food and cash for work´ projects, provision of seeds, farming 
implements, drying floors and storage facilities. 28% from governmental agencies such as the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food Security (MAFFS), 16% INGOs which include 
World Vision and Care International, 12% stated that they received support from local NGOs 
mostly supported by the above named inter-governmental, governmental agencies and 
INGOs. However, the forms of support initially received have diminished and some 
interviewees stated that they are rendered ineffective by this as it hinders their ability to 























The crucial question of whether the current economic status of the interviewees is better off 
than before the war had 80% of the interviewees stating that their pre-war economic status 
was better off than their current economic status. To them, they were reintegrated into 
poverty, they are faced with hardship and destitution as they cannot access decent forms of 
employment that will enable them move themselves and their families from poverty. A 
significant percentage (over 68%) stated that they were involved in agriculture and were 
having steady productions before the start of the war and also before it affected their 
communities. Others who were quite young when the war started stated that there was food in 
their households even though their families were faced with poverty. Ibrahim Kamara171 a 
former RUF middle level commander living in Freetown had this to say when interviewed: 
“Sometimes one gets tempted to commit suicide. Life is unbearable. My current economic 
status is very unhealthy; in fact I only exist as I am not living.  When one cannot get a job, 
cannot afford even one basic meal then that person is a dead man walking.” 
Alimamy Kalokoh172 stated “I used to have a job before the war. Now I do not have a job and 
I have the feeling that I will never get one. I do not have a house to sleep in; I sleep at the 
Victoria Park with birds and rats. When you ask about economic status, all I can say is that 
there is no status; there is only hunger and homelessness. I hold hope in the fact that I will 
find peace when I die for this world has failed me.” 
Like the above stated comments, a significant percentage of ex-combatants expressed 
dissatisfaction with their current conditions and are not optimistic of the future. 
                                                          
171
 Interview conducted on the 5th of January 2013. 
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Do you feel that your current economic status is 




27% of the former combatants stated (as indicated in the graph below) that they are in touch 
with their former colleagues while 73% stated that they are not in touch with them. The bulk 
of those who are in touch with their colleagues are former CDF combatants. There are few 
from the RUF and West Side Boys who are also in touch with their former colleagues. In 
Freetown there are joints were they hang out especially at the Government Wharf vicinity. A 
former RUF combatant173 presented his reason why he always tries to be in touch with his 
former colleagues: “Our former colleagues are the only true friends we have in this world. 
They are the only people who do not try to judge us. We all go through the same situation in 
life and we meet to drown our pains and sorrows. We share experiences and damn the world. 
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Based on information provided by the interviewees it was realised that the economic status of 
their former colleagues is not better than it was before the war. As illustrated in the graph 
below, 84% stated that their former colleagues’ economic status is worse than before the 
conflict, while 11% stated that they are better off than before the conflict and 5% stated that 
they do not know if there status is better than before the conflict174. The 11% that stated that 
the status of their colleagues is better now than before the war indicated that some were able 
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 Those who stated that they do not know if their economic status is better off than before the conflict were 







Is the current economic status of your colleagues 






5.2.2 Former Female Combatants 
 
This section presents the findings on the current economic status of former female combatants 
interviewed. The graph below indicates most of the trainings provided to former female 
combatants during the reintegration phase of DDR. 26% of the interviewees received training 
in agriculture, 24% in soap making, 19% in gara-tye dying, 11% in entrepreneurship, 9% in 
computing, 9% in basket weaving and 2% in tailoring. Most of the activities designed for 
training are activities that women commonly undertake in local communities. Critics of the 
DDR programme stated during interviews that there was a serious case of stereotyping. 
Activities designed for women and girls were not based on the actual needs of the 
beneficiaries but on what the designers felt they needed. These activities include gara-tye 
dying, soap making, tailoring and basket weaving. 30% of the interviewees stated that they 
would have preferred to get involved in more technical trainings (other than trainings in gara-

























The graph below indicates that 48% of the interviewees stated that they are employed, while 
52% indicated that they are unemployed. This is far more impressive when compared to the 









The graph below indicates the forms of employment that former female combatants are 
involved in. 55% of the interviewees who are employed are engaged in petty trading, 25% in 
agriculture, 12% in arts and crafts, 8% in tailoring and there was no interviewee that is 
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involved in information technology. Involvement in information technology was checked as 
9% of the interviewees partook in computer training. It was observed that almost all of those 
who were trained in agriculture are involved in agriculture or agriculture-related activities. 
The same is also true for those who were trained in arts and crafts and tailoring. Most of the 
interviewees also indicated that they are self-employed as they own and manage the 














As could be seen in the graph below, 32% of the female ex-combatants indicated that the jobs 











The graph below presents what the unemployed interviewees perceive to be the reasons for 
their unemployment. 41% indicated that they lack access to employment, 27% indicated that 
they are marginalized by potential employers because of their former status, 14% indicated 
that jobs are unavailable in their communities and even when there are jobs there is high 
competition for them so they end up not getting a job. 9% indicated that they cannot compete 
for jobs because they lack the required skills. The trainings provided during DDR is said to be 
insufficient to enable them secure available jobs. Also, some of them do not have any form of 
formal education and cannot read or write. This significantly affects their chances of 
competing for and securing decent forms of employment. 9% indicated that they do not have 
any source of information on employment opportunities available in their communities.  This 
they blamed on the non-availability of job information centers in their communities. With the 
exception of the stigmatization faced the reasons for unemployment provided by other young 
people (non-former-combatants) interviewed are similar to the reasons stated by the ex-
combatants. Like the former combatants those non-former-combatants with employment are 
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Land is of fundamental importance especially to ex-combatants who are or would like to be 
engaged in agriculture. Accessing and owning land has been a challenge especially to women 
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even in pre-war and war-affected Sierra Leone. However, in 2007 gender bills175 were passed 
into laws that are geared towards protecting and promoting the rights and welfare of women. 
These laws are opening the socio-economic and political space for women. Despite this, 33% 
of the interviewees stated (as indicated in the graph below) that they have no access to 
farming lands in their communities, while 33% stated that they have access, with 34% stating 
that they do not know if they have access. The area of the country where women face more 
challenges is the Northern Province.  
In Kambia, Hawa Sankoh176, a former RUF combatant, expressed the challenge she faces: 
“Land is said to be for men, women can only work on the land of their husbands or families. 
Some elderly women own lands they either inherited or have over the years secured from their 
families. Young and unmarried women like me cannot even discuss owning a land. This 
affects my involvement in agriculture as I am tired of working on the land of my family.”  
In some parts of the country including the Northern and the Southern regions, land is being 
rented for a fee or a percentage of the harvest. Securing a piece of land based on the 
agreement of paying a certain percentage of the harvest is seen as tricky by some of the 
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 The government in 2007 through the House of Parliament legislated the ‘three Gender Acts’ namely 
Registration of Customary Marriages and Divorce Act; Domestic Violence Act; and the Devolution of Estates Act  
as partial domestication of the Convention for the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW). 
176
 Interview conducted on the 15th of February 2013 in Kambia. 
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Getting involved in business requires having a start-up capital. However, start-up capital is 
difficult to secure as ex-combatants are mostly poor people who do not have savings or 
collateral to secure a loan. Thus, they have to look out for loans to begin a business they may 
want to get involved in. Only 8% of the interviewees (as indicated in the graph below) have 
succeeded in securing loans since the end of the DDR programme, while 92% have not 
secured any form of loan. Out of the 92%, 51% have tried and failed in their bid to secure a 
loan while 41% have never tried to secure any form of loan. Two of the lead institutions that 
have provided loans to the interviewees are BRAC and SEND West Africa (microfinance 
institutions). The loans secured have assisted some of the interviewees to begin tailoring, arts 
and crafts workshops and petty trading. 4% out of the 8% of the interviewees that have 





82% (see graph below) of the interviewees stated that their current economic status is worse 
than their pre-war economic status. When questioned as to why they believe this to be the 
case, the reasons they proffered included: inability to afford three basic meals, inability to pay 
for housing and other shelter related bills, inability to pay medical bills and school fees for 
children, no form of employment, and faced with stigmatization and stereotypes. Yeama 
Kalokoh178 accounted: “I go for days without a proper meal and when things become very 
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 Kindly note that this question was asked when it was realised during field consultations that there were 
regular referrals to loans related issues among former female combatants. Thus the question is not in the 
questionnaire as it was developed separately. 
178
 Interview conducted on the 23rd of January 2013 in Freetown.  
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tough I sometimes turn to prostitution to be able to get money and food. Even though I hate 
selling my body, it is the only means of survival that I have.” 
Other interviewees stated that they had families before the war and they were living in 
communities where they could at least get some basic food to eat. Also, after being recruited 
during the war, they were able to fend for themselves with the help of their guns, now they 
stated that they have no one to turn to for help. Josephine Kargbo179 explained that they were 
lied to by the DDR Commission: “They made us believe that our lives would get better when 
we drop our guns; this they knew was never going to be the case. They lied to us. However, 




Do you feel that your current economic status is 




As depicted in the graph below, 28% of the ex-combatants stated that they are in touch with 
their former colleagues while 72% stated that they are not in touch with them. Most of those 
who are in touch with their colleagues reside in South-Eastern regions and the Western Area. 
While in the case of male interviewees the greater percentage of those who are in touch with 
former colleagues are former CDF combatants, in the case of the female interviewees the 
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79% (as could be seen in the graph below) of the interviewees stated that the economic status 
of their colleagues is worse than it used to be before the conflict. They stated that most of 
their colleagues are faced with the same challenges that they face and some are even worse 
off than they are. Fatu Kallon180 explained what is happening or has happened to some of her 
former colleagues: “I have seen some of my friends die from common illnesses such as 
malaria and typhoid. They could not afford to buy medications that are very basic and cheap. 
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Is the economic status of your former 




Like the male interviewees the female interviewees are of the conviction that the socio-
economic conditions in the country are unfavourable to their reintegration process. Thus, the 
female combatants believe that they were reintegrated into poverty as the economy does not 
have the capacity to absorb the ex-combatants and provide them with employment 
opportunities. Former female combatants are faced with some of the challenges as former 
male combatants. However, their reintegration process is made much more difficult by the 




The economic status of the bulk of the interviewees is worse than it used to be before the war. 
This position was also taken by former CAAFGs who were not economically productive 
before the war. They stated that their families could at least afford to provide them with food 
and shelther. 
It was observed that some of the other ex-combatants interviewed during field consultants live 
under very difficult economic conditions. They lack employment and cannot compete for 
decent forms of livelihoods because they lack the required skills or education. Coupled with 
this, ex-combatants are faced with lack of access to information related to employment, 
marginalization and limited availability of employment opportunities. The lack of trust in ex-
combatants on the part of potential employers also gravely affects the employment potentials 
103 
 
of former combatants. However, the high rate of unemployment is not limited to former 
combatants, other people in the country (especially young people) are also affected and 
cannot fend for themselves or their families.  
The skills training provided to ex-combatants during DDR has not helped many of the ex-
combatants as they were either too short or ill-organised and badly delivered. A significant 
percentage of the ex-combatants interviewed have not found the trainings they partook in to 
be useful to their reintegration process. Even those who are employed at the moment 
complained of how limited the trainings were. Also, some of those who are employed or self-
employed are engaged in activities that are unrelated to the trainings undertaken.  
Key provisions that could have assisted the economic reintegration process of former 
combatants that are lacking are: provision of employment centres that will provide 
information on employment, conduct follow-up trainings for ex-combatants, link potential 
employers and employees, constructively engage the public and private sectors to create 
employment opportunities and employ former combatants etc.  
Instead of making the above stated provisions to aid the reintegration process of former 
combatants,  ex-combatants were basically left on their own after the reintegration programme 
came to an end. Even those who were interested in going to school (especially children) did 
not have post-DDR arrangements made for their education. Accelerated Learning 
Programmes (ALPs) for the older children came to an abrupt end at the end of the DDR 
programme and also adult education programmes also came to an end. Such programmes 
would have propelled a significant proportion of the beneficiaries to higher education, thereby 
enabling them achieve an educational level that would have allowed them to compete for 
livelihood opportunities.  
Also, very limited financial/material support has been provided to some ex-combatants after 
the DDR programme. Loans, trainings and equipments which are key to ex-combatants 
becoming self-employed have been provided only to a limited number of them. While this 
support is invaluable to those that have benefitted from it, it makes very little difference to the 
overall economic condition of ex-combatants as a significant percentage have not received 
any assistance.  
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Ex-combatants expressed a lack of faith in the system and recent political events (2007 and 
2012)181 showed that they can easily be re-recruited by any person or group that can afford to 
pay them. While it may be argued that Sierra Leone enjoys stable peace and security, one may 
be tempted to counter-argue that ex-combatants ´do not eat peace´. The poverty they have 
been reintegrated into has denied them the very basic things they need in life that will enable 
them live in peace: food, clothing and shelther. These basic necessities that some may take for 
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 During the 2007 elections the leaders of the major political parties APC and SLPP mobilised ex-combatants 
and used them as body guards and as thugs in their parties. This created tension in the country and the 
international community and local actors appealed to the parties to stop the use of ex-combatants by political 
leaders. Similar appeals were made during the 2012 elections when the two parties started remobilising ex-
combatants to use them as bodyguards. 
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6. Conclusions and recommendations       
 6.1 Final Conclusions 
 
This study was able to draw out the realities faced by former combatants 10 years after the 
conflict in Sierra Leone. Seven years ago (2005) the DDR programme led by the NCDDR and 
supported by the International Community came to an end and it was referred to by many 
experts as a success story and an example for other countries to follow. Indeed, Sierra Leone 
has not relapsed into a violent conflict and it continues to strengthen the pillars of democracy, 
rule of law and human rights which are of immense significance in the peacebuildng process. 
However, it became evident during the study that for several former combatants who were the 
key targets of the DDR programme, life is not as good as they had hoped it would be. In fact, 
most of them stated that their lives are miserable and that they are worse off than they were 
before and during the civil conflict.  
The current challenges faced by the former combatants are hinged on certain failures of the 
DDR programme which are discussed below. Planning for the last phase (third phase) of DDR 
was short and ineffective. The key concern was to collect the weapons from the combatants 
and demobilize their structures with little consideration put into their socio-economic 
reintegration. Coupled with this, the local communities that were a key stakeholder in the 
reintegration process of former combatants were not constructively engaged. Thus, some 
communities either became spoilers to the process or were at best indifferent to it. At the same 
time, activities designed were not context-specific as the realities on the ground were not 
known by those who designed the reintegration programme and needs assessments of the ex-
combatants and receiving communities were not done.  
As is the case with all post-conflict countries, the structures and institutions in the country 
were badly destroyed and this created a case in which the number of service providers 
available was very limited. As explained by reintegration experts such as Joe Patrick Amara 
and Idowu Ibishomi182, alongside the challenges stated above, the service providers lacked the 
facilities, trainings and equipments needed to train the former combatants. Even in places 
where such facilities were available, the number of ex-combatants to be trained far exceeded 
the number that the facilities could handle. This had a negative impact on the training 
                                                          
182
 Interviews conducted in 2011. 
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programmes as ex-combatants were left with little capacity to compete for decent jobs or even 
begin their own enterprises.  
In most cases, especially for women, trainings provided were stereotypical and gender 
insensitive. For instance, some trainings were based on activities considered by society to be 
only for women. These included gara-tye dying, soap making and weaving. Trainings were 
not based on the opportunities available in local communities. This is also due to the fact that 
opportunity mappings and market surveys (the reintegration programme designers had limited 
knowledge on the significance of opportunity mapping and market surveys when designing 
trainings and employment-related activities for ex-combatants) were not carried out as part of 
the assessments done for reintegration. Thus, in most cases, former combatants were provided 
with trainings that had no readily available employment market. One of such trainings 
provided was computing. It was clear to those who profiled the ex-combatants that most of 
them were illiterate and it will take a long time before they could go close to a computer but 
they still continued to train them in computing. This created the challenge of ex-combatants 
provided with what was not useful to them.  
The timeframe was also short as trainings were done between 3 to 6 months. For agriculture 
and tailoring this may not be too bad but for technical jobs the period was too short. However, 
there was a limited budget and timeframe for the NCDDR and they did not go further than the 
planned timeline.  
The harsh realities of a post-conflict setting faced the ex-combatants after the DDR 
programme. Most of those interviewed indicated that they could not find a job or even 
compete for one when it is available. They lack the skills required and the bulk of them have 
very limited formal education as they only gained primary education. This places them in a 
difficult situation as they have to take care of themselves and their families. Most of those 
interviewed cannot afford one basic meal a day and they have to resort to odd jobs to enable 
them get food and shelter.  
The major forms of employment for interviewees employed are agriculture and petty trading 
(for the women it is mostly petty trading). Some of those who are unemployed have been 
trying to seek loans or micro-credits that will serve as start-up capitals but have not been able 
to do so. The key reasons why they cannot secure such loans are that they have no collateral, 
cannot have people to serve as guarantors for them and in some cases the loans are tailored in 
such a way that young people could not meet the set criteria. Despite this, some have secured 
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loans through organisations like BRAC, SEND-West Africa, Finance Salone and Hope 
Microfinance Salone. These organisations  provide micro-credits and financial trainings to 
women, low income earners and small enterprise owners.  
In some parts of the country, especially in the Northern and Southern regions, accessing land 
is a huge challenge to young and unmarried former female combatants. However, such 
restrictions are not only limited to former female combatants as the societies are patriachal 
and women and girls have been continuously marginalised for decades. This limits the 
economic potential of the former combatants as they cannot partake in the key economic 
activity (which is agriculture) in their community. Some move to other communities where 
they could access lands that are either rented or are owned by acquaintances.  
The economic status of the former combatants negatively impacts their health and other 
statuses. For instance, they cannot afford to pay for medical bills when ill and some even 
reported (as indicated in the findings) that they have seen some of their former colleagues die 
from curable diseases such as malaria, dysentry, diarrhoea and typhoid. Some of them still 
suffer from war-related physical and mental conditions (psycho-social related issues are 
discussed below) such as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), Vesico-Vaginal Fistulae 
(VVF), Schizophrenia, or loss of limbs but cannot afford to seek medical assistance. Some are 
reported to be dying or have died in silence. 
The social status of former ex-combatants is equally marred with challenges. Inasmuch as a 
significant number of the male interviewees live in communities of choice rather than 
communities of origin, the reverse is true for female interviewees. Nonetheless, interviewees 
that are recognised as former combatants in their communities reported being stigmatised and 
are faced with stereotypes. This creates a sense of being unwelcomed and insecure.  
While (unlike other countries like Angola and Mozambique) Sierra Leone has been faced with 
very little confrontations between ex-combatants and receiving communities, it should be 
noted that very little reconciliation activites were implemented after the TRC and the SCSL. 
The only known initiative that is still in progress is the Fambul Tok project. The lack of such 
initiatives makes it difficult for some former combatants to return to their communities of 
origin. This is still a major concern especially among former RUF combatants. Unlike former 
RUF combatants, former Kamajors are mostly found in their communities of origin as they 
are still seen as heroes.  
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Some combatants did not go through DDR, they either auto-demobilized or moved on to other 
conflicts in the region (Liberia and Cote d‘Ivoire). Those that went to Liberia and Cote 
d’Ivoire are returning to Sierra Leone and are finding it difficult to reintegrate while those 
who auto-demobilized are finding it difficult to go back to their communities of origin as 
there is no formal support process to ensure this. Thus, they are on their own in the major 
cities striving to survive in the midst of the uncertainties that they face.  
Due to the limited psycho-social support that the ex-combatants received during reintegration 
(those who auto-demobilized received no support) some turned to drugs and alcohol. There is 
a high rate of drugs and alcohol consumers among especially the former RUF and 
AFRC/West Side Boys (Bangura, Specht 2012). Some interviewees working in government 
agencies stated that their is a correlation between the use of drugs and the increase in the 
crime rate in major cities. 
Some ex-combatants are shying away from society because of the limited psycho-social 
support they received. 10 years after the conflict they can still not cope with the normal 
society. This is why some resorted to drugs and alcohol abuse. With drugs and alcohol they 
can temporarily shelve away the realities faced. 
The challenges faced in the reintegration process show that DDR is only a minute part of  the 
overall post-war reconstruction process. If the other components and institutions (such 
components include the economy, rehabilitation, institution-building, the fight against 
corruption, investment in the education and health sectors, observance and respect for the rule 
of law and human rights, etc.) do not function effectively then the reintegration process of 
former combatants will be greatly affected.  
In the face of all these challenges, it can be concluded that some of the ex-combatants are still 
vulnerable and could be re-recruited to perpetrate violence (this can be backed with the fact 
that in 2007 and 2012 elections politicians mobilized them to perpetrate elections violence. 
They were easy to recruit and at the same time prepared to create chaos). They are desperate, 
poor, hungry and in need of employment. It could be concluded that they were reintegrated 
into poverty and the overall reconstruction process has not been able to fully absorb the ex-
combatants and make provision for their successful reintegration. This has to a large extent 
reversed the gains of the reintegration programme. 





To overcome the challenges highlighted in the findings and conclusion sections of this study, 
several actions have to be taken by the different stakeholders involved in the post-war 
reconstruction and nation-building ongoing in Sierra Leone. These actions include:  
Further Research 
The research brought up very interesting issues that call for futher studies that should 
critically look into them. These issues are: 
• The post-war recovery process in Sierra Leone 
• The nexus between unemployment and conflict in Sierra Leone  
• Transitional justice programmes (traditional and Western) and the reintegration 
process of ex-combatants in Sierra Leone 
It is obvious that DDR is only part of the overall post-war reconstruction process and if the 
other components of the process do not work properly it is bound to fail. It is important that a 
study is done that will examine the entire reconstruction process with the successes and 
failures of the DDR programme also assessed.  
The nexus between unemployment and conflict also has to be further studied. While looking 
at this, the mechanisms put in place by the different stakeholders to reduce unemployment 
should also be examined. In particular, unemployment should be looked at in relation to 
young people as they are the most vulnerable group with a high propensity to get involved in 
violence and chaos. 
During field consultantions it became evident that there are still ongoing transitional justice 
processes (for e.g. Fambul Tok) in some communities especially in the East (Kailahun).  
Inasmuch as data were collected on these processes, they are insufficient to give a very clear 
understanding of the impact created. This has to be also coupled with the impact of the TRC 
and the SCSL and their legacies. Transitional justice mechanisms have to be studied with a 






The government with the support of international and local actors such as the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), National Youth Commission (NAYCOM), National 
Commission for Social Action and the University of Sierra Leone should conduct a nation-
wide study on the current socio-economic status of former combatants. This study could be 
carried out with a similar study on the state of young people in Sierra Leone. It will put the 
government and other stakeholders in a better position to design programmes and projects that 
are geared towards making a positive difference in the lives and welfare of Sierra Leoneans, 
especially young people.  
The study on the socio-economic status of young people and former combatants should be 
followed up with a nation-wide opportunity mapping and market survey. Opportunity 
mapping and market surveys as required to provide a link between the profile of the ex-
combatants and the opportunities existing in the market (Specht 97:9). It is an exercise that is 
geared towards providing a good understanding of the  actual economic opportunities existing 
in a community. With the findings and recommendations of the mapping and survey 
exercises, the government and other stakeholders would be in a position to have a strategic 
focus on how to assist Sierra Leoneans to become either employed or self-employed. 
Organisations such as the United Nations Development Programme and Restless 
Development (a UK-based INGO with a branch in Sierra Leone) have started working on 
conducting market surveys but on a very small scale. Such initiatives could be built upon on a 
national scale.  
To assist Sierra Leoneans to access employment or become self-employed, the government 
should concentrate on three areas: agriculture, entrepreneurship and career development.  The 
reasons why these three sectors should be concentrated on are:  
(a) Agriculture is the biggest employer in the country; despite this, it is still under-
engaged as it has the potential to create more job opportunities. People still focus on 
subsistence farming instead of cash crop production; at the same time Sierra Leoneans 
have not explored the potentials of value chain development especially those that are 
agro-based. Young people focused investment in agriculture will reduce the rate of 
unemployment and subsequently the crime rate in the country. Also, more ex-
combatants would be induced to return to the interior of Sierra Leone and engage in 
agriculture. This would reduce migration into major cities, reduce congestion and its 
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related risks and also the crime rate in especially Freetown. Agriculture, is the biggest 
employer in the country and it has the potential of providing employment 
opportunities to a significant percentage of former combatants if the government and 
other stakeholders would invest in it. In line with this, former female combatants have 
to be provided with access to land and given the required support needed to establish 
themselves in agriculture and related activities.  
(b) Entrepreneurship: Many young Sierra Leoneans have the willingness to go into 
business, but are faced with the challenge of accessing start-up capitals. Providing 
young people with the support needed to enable them begin and own their own 
businesses will also help to reduce the level of unemployment and subsequently the 
frustration, poverty, idleness and crime rate in the country. To ensure this, the 
government with the support of the private sector should establish a ‘National Youth 
Development Fund‘ like those established in Uganda and Zimbabwe (Restless 
Development 2012). This fund should be designed with the key objective of providing 
young people with start-up capitals. This will significantly and equally benefit former 
combatants and other young people in local communities.  
(c) Career Development: Under this component, the government and other stakeholders 
should develop life skills and vocational training schemes through which young 
people would gain the skills required to seek employment. This component should be 
backed with internships, job placement, apprenticeships and other employment 
possibilities. It should be noted that the private and public sectors would be of 
strategic significance in providing employment opportunities to young people. 
However, they have to be mobilized and sensitized on the role(s) they are expected to 
play.  
Investment in the employment sector has to go alongside investment in the education and 
health sectors. In the area of education, accelerated (fast track) learning programmes and adult 
education have to be established for adult learners. This will enable them read and write 
which is of great use in the areas of entrepreneurship, career development or agriculture. 
Adult learners would be in a position to keep record of their business and make informed 
decisions.  
It was observed during field consultations that some of the former combatants still suffer from 
post-traumatic stress disorder and other psycho-social conditions related to the conflict. These 
challenges faced have a negative impact on the lives of those affected and also present a great 
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risk to those in their communities. An effort should be made by the government and other 
stakeholders to identify those affected and provide them with the medical assistance they 
require. There are several existing cases and these include victims and perpetrators of 
violence during the conflict in the country. 
The decentralization process should ensure that the socio-political space is opened to all sexes 
and groups of people. Young people and women should be encouraged and allowed to 
participate in decision-making processes within their local communities and also at the 
national level. The constant marginalization of young people creates tension between them 
and their elders, these tensions sometimes lead to young people migrating to the cities.  
Also, as part of the decentralization process, the stakeholders should ensure that basic social 
facilities and amenities are provided to local communities. These include schools, hospitals 
and recreational facilities. While there are schools and clinics built in some communities there 
is an absolute lack of recreational facilities. The lack of such facilities helps to augment the 
stress and tension in especially young people who need an outlet. Facilities that should be 
created are games and youth centers.  
While it is obvious that Sierra Leone needs time to fully recover from the relics of the 
conflict, it is also obvious that the pace it is going at is very slow and frustrating especially for 
the former combatants. However, if the above stated recommendations are taken into 
consideration, the former combatants and other Sierra Leoneans would be in a position to 
access alternative sources of livelihood and also contribute to the socio-economic and 
political development of their country. For them the critical challenge faced is unemployment, 
illiteracy and poverty. With education and employment they will become less vulnerable to 
the call of those who rally them for chaos and mayhem.  
Former Combatants 
Ex-combatants should not shy away from mainstream society: It was observed that some ex-
combatants are living very reclusive lives. This is due to the fact that they do not trust the 
societies in which they live and they have not been provided with the kind of psycho-social 
support that they needed to prepare them for their re-entry into normal societies.  
In relation to the paragraph above, many ex-combatants have been unable to grab the few 
opportunities available in their communities because they do not have the spirit to compete 
for them. Ex-combatants should be encouraged and supported to see themselves as normal 
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human beings that are now part of normal societies. This calls for sensitization and psycho-
social assistance from qualified psycho-social personnel who are supported by the 
government or other stakeholders. While it may be argued that undertaking such initiatives in 
a post-DDR setting may be challenging, these initiatives could be undertaken not exclusively 
for ex-combatants but more generally for Sierra Leoneans in need of such support. 
As stated in the conclusion section there is a high rate of drugs and alcohol consumers among 
especially the former RUF and AFRC/West Side Boys. Psycho-social support provided 
should also be tailored towards supporting them to stop substance abuse. However, the ex-
combatants should be made aware of the role they personally have to play to make this 
happen.  
Civil Society 
Civil society has a crucial role to play in the reintegration process of ex-combatants. 
Organisations like Fambul Tok identified the challenges faced in the reconciliation process 
between ex-combatants and receiving communities and they started a traditional transitional 
justice mechanism that is of great significance to the peace process in the country. Other civil 
society organisations should assess the challenges faced by ex-combatants and other young 
people within local communities and then pressure the government to work towards moving 
them away from the poverty and destitution they live in.  
It is obvious that the major challenges faced by ex-combatants and other civilians are 
unemployment, illiteracy, lack of access to social institutions such as schools, housing, 
medical facilities, recreational facilities, lack of access to capital etc. Civil society should 
ensure that the government takes tangible steps in meeting the demands of the people. If such 
demands are met, Sierra Leoneans would be able to live in decency and dignity and this will  
strengthen peace and tranquillity in the country. 
Civil society should also work towards ensuring that the stigmatization and stereotypes faced 
by ex-combatants are overcome. The stigmatization faced is one of the reasons for the 
withdrawal from society by some ex-combatants. Campaigns against stereotypes in local 
communities have to be mixed with gender and social justice related campaigns. This is 
because women are most affected. 
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Such campaigns have to be also linked with similar initiatives geared towards opening the 
social and political space for all Sierra Leoneans including youth, women and people with 
disabilities.  
International Community 
International and intergovernmental organisations that supported the DDR programme in 
Sierra Leone still have a role to play in the reintegration process of ex-combatants. Some of 
the roles they could play include: 
They should continue supporting the employment and education initiatives undergoing in the 
country. While some of the initiatives are channeled through the National Youth Commission, 
it should be ensured that they are results-oriented and those benefitting are young people in 
actual need.  
UNDP should ensure that the opportunity mapping exercise it has undertaken in some districts 
should be done on a national scale. Opportunity mappings provide the actual guidance needed 
to make interventions that could be based on the actual opportunities availabe in local 
communities. This should be done in line with market surveys that will inform the target 
groups of the actual needs of the market.  
One of the greatest needs in Sierra Leone for all categories of Sierra Leoneans is access to 
health facilities. Former combatants and other Siera Leoneans are in need of psycho-social 
support. The international community could support the process of overcoming the mental 
health challenges faced in the country by supporting the training of psycho-social experts and 
developing health institutions that they will work with in helping Sierra Leoneans in need of 
assistance.  
While there may be the question as to how funds could be secured to finance such broad 
recommendations, it should be noted that such initiatives could be successfully implemented 
if there is the political will. Similar initiatives have been discussed and promised in the 
government’s Agenda for Prosperity (GoSL 2013) as part of its economic recovery and nation 
building programme. The government and other relevant stakeholders should work on 
achieving the promised initiatives rather than just making promises.  
If the above stated recommendations are looked into they will help move the ex-combatants 
out of the poverty they have been reintegrated into. Also, it will help other Sierra Leoneans 
faced with similar challenges to access employment and other socio-economic opportunities. 
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Subsequently, it will reduce the current state of frustration and tension in the country 
especially among young people.  
Also, other countries such as Syria, Iraq, South Sudan, Afghanistan and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo should learn from the lessons of Sierra Leone. A key lesson is that DDR 
exercises are costly and they should be well planned with sufficient resources secured to have 
effective and sustainable reintegration programmes. If this is not done the countries stated 
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Annex 1: Research Questionnaire 
‘I am  trying to find out what the current socio-economic status of the ex-combatants is 10 
years after the war in Sierra Leone, what they did while during the DDR process;  and what 
they are doing at the moment in terms of employment. I am doing this to know how 
employment opportunities provided by DDR are helping to transform the lives of the ex-

















7. Age  




9. Sex: Male [ ] Female [ ] 
10. Level of Education: 
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 None Primary Secondary High Skill 
      
 
11. What faction were you part of..............................................? 
12. How long did you serve as a combatant? 
13. Did you volunteer to become a fighter or were you forcefully recruited? 
a) Volunteered    [ ] 
b) Forcefully recruited   [ ] 
 
14. What role did you play? 
a) Fighter    [ ] 
b) Spy     [ ] 
c) Cook      [ ] 
d) Bush wife    [ ] 
e) Load carriers    [ ] 
f) Other, Please specify............................................................................. 
 
15. Did you go through DDR? 
a) Yes   [ ] 
b) No   [ ]  
16. If yes, what year did you go through DDR? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
17. Are you currently living in your community of origin or choice........................................? 
18. Do you face discrimination in your community? 
a. Yes [ ]  
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b. No [ ] 
19. Do people in your community still recognise you as a former combatant? 
a. Yes [ ] 
b. No [ ] 
c. Don’t know [ ] 
 
20. What kind of training were you provided with during DDR? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
21. Are you currently employed or self-employed? 
 
Yes [ ] No [ ] 
22. If no, why 
not………………………………………………………………………………..? 
 
23. If yes, are you working in the area related to the training provided during DDR? Please 
specify what work you are doing? 
 
 
24. If no, why not………………………………………………………………………………? 
 
25. Do you feel that your current socio-economic condition is better off than during the pre-
war period? 
a) Yes   [ ] 
b) No  [ ] 
26) Do you play any leadership role in your community? 
a) Yes [ ] 
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b) No [ ] 
27. Have you received any support after DDR? 
a) Yes  [ ] 
b) No  [ ] 
28) If yes, what kind of 
support…………………………………………………………………? 
29) From what kind of organisation do you get support? 
a) Governmental [ ] 
b) INGO  [ ] 
c) NGO/CBO  [ ] 
 
30. Are you still in touch with some of your former colleagues? 
a) Yes [ ] 
b) No [ ] 
31) If yes,  is there economic status better thna before the war? 
a) Yes    [ ] 
b) No   [ ] 










Annex 2: Organisations visited during field consultations 
 
No Organisation  Location 
1 National Commission for Social Action (NACSA) Freetown 
2 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Freetown, Kenema 
3 United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in 
Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) 
Freetown 
4 United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) Freetown, Makeni 
5 World Food Programme (WFP) Freetown, Kenema 
6 Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) Freetown, The Hague, 
Netherlands 
7 Ministry of Internal Affairs Freetown 
8 Ministry of Defence  Freetown 
9 Ministry of Health and Sanitation Freetown, Kenema, Bo, 
Makeni 
10 Ministry of Social Welfare,  Gender and 
Children’s Affairs 
Freetown 
11 National Human Rights Commission Freetown, Bo 
12 Handicap International Freetown 
13 Defence for Children International (DCI) Freetown 
14 Center for Accountability and Rule of Law 
(CARL) 
Freetown 
15 Care International Freetown 
16 OXFAM UK Freetown 
17 Finance Salone Freetown 
18 BRAC Microfinance Sierra Leone Limited Freetown 
19 Peace and Conflict Studies Programme, 
University of Sierra Leone 
Freetown 





21 German Agency for International Agency (GIZ) Freetown 
22 National Youth Commission (NAYCOM) Freetown 
23 United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) 
Freetown 
24 Conciliation Resources Freetown 
25 Concern Worldwide Freetown 
26 Campaign for Good Governance (CGG) Freetown 
27 Sierra Leone Association for Journalists (SLAJ) Freetown 
28 Japanese International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA) 
Freetown 
29 Freetown City Council Freetown 
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